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CHARACTER ASSASSINATION: AMENDING FEDERAL RULE 
OF EVIDENCE 404(B) TO PROTECT CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS 
Daniel J. Capra* & Liesa L. Richter** 
There is a war raging over the admissibility of the prior bad acts of 
criminal defendants in federal trials. While many circuits treat Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) as a rule of “inclusion” and liberally admit 
such prior bad-acts evidence with predictably explosive effects on 
criminal juries, a few circuits are developing rigorous standards de-
signed to foreclose prosecutorial use of such bad-acts evidence. This 
Article chronicles the well-documented permissive admission of the prior 
bad acts of criminal defendants notwithstanding the prohibition on 
such evidence by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), as well as recent 
efforts by some federal circuits to restrict such evidence. In light of these 
contemporary developments, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules is currently considering amendments to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) to restore the intended exclusionary purpose of 
the Rule. This Article details several drafting alternatives being 
considered by the Committee, as well as the likely costs and beneﬁts of 
each, and proposes a simple and elegant ﬁx for what ails Rule 
404(b)—a more protective balancing test that admits the prior bad acts 
of criminal defendants only when their probative value outweighs any 
unfair prejudice to the defendant. Tipping the scale in favor of exclu-
sion of prior bad-acts evidence would restore the protective purpose of 
Rule 404(b), while continuing to permit the government to admit such 
evidence in appropriate and necessary circumstances. This balance 
would bring Rule 404(b) into alignment with existing Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609, which allows the felony convictions of testifying criminal 
defendants to be admitted for impeachment purposes only when their 
probative value outweighs unfair prejudice. This Article takes on the 
thorny contemporary issues surrounding the admissibility of prior bad-
acts evidence and identiﬁes the optimal amendment to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b). This amendment would resolve the current conﬂict 
among the federal circuits and restore the prohibition on trial by 
character, which is a cornerstone of the American criminal process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[E]very man is entitled to be valued by his best moment.”1 
    Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
Imagine a routine traffic stop in which officers decide to search the 
vehicle due to suspected drug activity. Rather than submitting to the 
search, the occupant of the vehicle drives off, leading officers on a high-
speed chase. Brought to a stop by a tactical maneuver, the suspect ﬂees 
on foot into the woods and evades capture. A subsequent search reveals 
distribution quantities of cocaine, large amounts of cash, and loaded 
weapons in the vehicle. Almost two years later, a suspect is arrested and 
charged with drug offenses resulting from the cocaine found in the car. 
His sole defense at trial is that the prosecutor has the wrong man and 
that he was not the occupant of the vehicle. In response, the prosecutor 
seeks to introduce the defendant’s dissimilar, unrelated ten-year-old 
prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The 
                                                                                                                           
 1. 6 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Conduct of Life, in The Complete Works of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson 1, 287 (1904). 
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defense objects: “You can’t use his prior offenses to prove he is a drug-
dealing sort—nothing about this prior conviction helps resolve the only 
real dispute in this case, which is about the identity of the perpetrator.” 
The trial judge overrules the objection and the defendant is convicted in 
connection with the traffic-stop incident. Of course he is—because what 
jury could ignore the fact that he had “done it before”? On appeal, the 
defendant’s conviction is affirmed by the appellate court in a cursory 
opinion which concludes that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court’s admission of the defendant’s prior conviction to show his “know-
ledge” and “intent.” 
In reality, there is no need to use any imagination whatsoever to 
develop this scenario—it is one that is consistently replayed in legions of 
cases in the federal reporters, particularly in federal drug prosecutions.2 
Although every capable attorney knows that past misdeeds are not admis-
sible to prove a defendant’s criminal conduct, the truth is that Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) is used to admit evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, and acts in criminal trials every day. In fact, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) is the most frequently utilized and cited rule of evi-
dence and “has generated more published opinions than any other sub-
section of the rules.”3 
The prohibition on character evidence is a time-honored tenet of 
evidence law. The American adversary system was designed to convict 
defendants based upon their conduct and not based on their general 
character or past misdeeds. Rule 404(b) was designed to further this 
purpose as a rule of exclusion, prohibiting evidence of uncharged acts 
offered to prove a person’s character (most often the criminal defen-
dant’s character) in order to demonstrate his or her conduct on the 
occasion in question.4 To accommodate cases in which a defendant’s 
other acts may be probative for another noncharacter purpose, Rule 
404(b)(2) expressly authorizes admission of other-acts evidence to prove 
matters like motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
                                                                                                                           
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 929–30 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming 
admission of defendant’s eight-year-old conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute to prove “knowledge” and “intent”). 
 3. 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence § 901, LexisNexis 
(6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence]. The 
Advisory Committee has made similar ﬁndings: 
Rule 404(b) has emerged as one of the most cited Rules in the Rules of 
Evidence. And in many criminal cases evidence of an accused’s extrinsic 
acts is viewed as an important asset in the prosecution’s case against an 
accused. Although there are a few reported decisions on use of such evi-
dence by the defense, see, e.g., United States v. McClure, 546 F.2d 670, 
672–73 (5th Cir. 1990) (acts of informant in entrapment defense), the 
overwhelming number of cases involve introduction of that evidence by 
the prosecution. 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 4. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
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identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.5 For example, evidence 
that a criminal defendant stole a key that was used to gain access to a 
business he is charged with robbing would be admissible during his 
robbery prosecution to prove preparation. In such a case, the theft of the 
key is not relevant solely because it shows the defendant’s criminal ten-
dencies; rather it is crucial to demonstrate his ability to commit the 
charged robbery. 
Notwithstanding its origins as part of a rule with an exclusionary pur-
pose, Rule 404(b) has been characterized by many federal circuit courts 
as a rule of inclusion.6 Treating the Rule as one of inclusion, federal 
courts routinely admit other-acts evidence, especially in drug cases like 
the one envisioned above. This occurs even when the relevance of the 
defendant’s uncharged acts depends on the defendant’s propensity to 
behave in certain ways and even when the defendant has not contested 
elements of the charged offense that the other-acts evidence would be 
used to prove.7 Utilizing the applicable Rule 403 balancing standard that 
favors the admission of evidence, federal courts routinely ﬁnd that the 
probative value of other-acts evidence is not “substantially outweighed” 
by the risk of prejudice to a criminal defendant.8 As one commentator 
has suggested, “the character rule is steadily losing ground and is per-
haps on its way to disappearing” as a result of this cavalier approach to 
prior bad-acts evidence.9 Scholars have long lamented the ease with 
which the government is permitted to sway a jury by parading a criminal 
defendant’s past misdeeds before it.10 Proof of a criminal defendant’s 
past crimes has a dramatic effect on a jury, almost guaranteeing conviction.11 
                                                                                                                           
 5. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The phrase “other acts”—often used by law professors—
is intended to describe acts that are not part of the crime charged. Another phrase often 
used is “uncharged misconduct.” Reference throughout this Article to “acts” and “mis-
conduct” covers evidence of bad acts even if the defendant has not been convicted of 
those acts. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–90 (1988) (holding that 
uncharged misconduct evidence is potentially admissible if the government can establish a 
prima facie case that the defendant committed the act). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 7. See Smith, 789 F.3d at 930 (rejecting defendant’s argument that the uncharged 
misconduct was irrelevant to the sole dispute in the case). 
 8. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 9. Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 
Ga. L. Rev. 775, 777 (2013). 
 10. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged 
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character 
Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 575, 578 (1990) (noting how courts have expanded 
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct to the point of substantially undermining the 
character-evidence prohibition); David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence 
Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 Ind. L.J. 1161, 1164 
(1998) (arguing that expanding admissibility of other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is 
inconsistent with the moral foundations for the rule); Milich, supra note 9, at 776 (“The 
American rule barring character evidence in criminal cases is degrading in every sense of 
the word.”); Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on 
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Recently, the Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuits have endeavored 
to restore the prohibition on bad-character evidence by requiring trial 
courts to take a harder look at evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. Speciﬁcally, these circuits demand that trial courts ar-
ticulate the chain of reasoning supporting the relevance of other-acts 
evidence and forbid any use of such evidence that proceeds through a 
propensity line of reasoning.12 In addition, these courts have emphasized 
the importance of assessing the genuine disputes involved in a criminal 
trial, carefully restricting other-acts evidence in cases in which the de-
fendant has not actively contested the element to which the other act is 
relevant.13 Finally, some courts have sought to eliminate the ill-deﬁned 
“inextricably intertwined” doctrine, which allows other-acts evidence to 
be admitted without scrutiny under Rule 404(b), on the theory that the 
evidence is vaguely connected to the charged offense.14 
As other circuits continue to admit other-acts evidence liberally by 
viewing Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion, the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has begun to consider whether 
an amendment to Rule 404(b) could resolve the apparent split among 
the circuit courts and restore the intended balance to the admission of 
other-acts evidence.15 The well-reasoned cases in the Third, Fourth, and 
                                                                                                                           
Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 Rev. Litig. 181, 184 (1998) (“[C]ourts 
routinely admit bad acts evidence precisely for its relevance to defendant propensity.”); 
Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 
404(b), 78 Temp. L. Rev. 201, 214 (2005) (“Typically, the courts use . . . Rule 404(b) as a 
window to permit bad character evidence to be proved against the accused.”); David A. 
Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of Intent in the Federal Courts, 45 
Creighton L. Rev. 215, 216–17 (2011) (arguing that admitting other-acts evidence as pro-
bative of intent is inherently problematic). 
 11. See Milich, supra note 9, at 780 (“Once the jury learns that the defendant has a 
criminal past, the odds of conviction skyrocket.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing 
Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants 
with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289, 295 & n.18 (2008) (citing empirical evi-
dence indicating the signiﬁcant negative effect on a jury of prior convictions admitted to 
impeach a criminal defendant). But see Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating 
Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 493, 507–08, 522–26 (2011) (arguing conviction rates are unaf-
fected by admission of bad-acts evidence and advocating for liberal admissibility of such 
evidence). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(explaining that other-acts evidence should not be admitted in order to show the defen-
dant’s propensity to commit crimes). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
probative value of prior act evidence is diminished where the defendant does not contest 
the fact for which supporting evidence has been offered.”). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (demonstrating 
that the inextricably intertwined test is “vague, overbroad, and prone to abuse” and ulti-
mately rejecting it as the primary standard for intrinsic evidence). 
 15. See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Fall 2016 Meeting Agenda 69–71 
(Oct. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Fall 2016 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda], www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/ﬁles/2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [http://perma.cc/TCM9-5E7D]. Of 
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Seventh Circuits provide many possibilities for amendment—and a 
number of drafting alternatives for the Advisory Committee to consider. 
Rule 404(b) could be revised to expressly forbid the admission of any 
other act that depends upon a propensity inference for its probative 
value. Alternatively, or in addition to such a propensity ban, Rule 404(b) 
could be amended to require “active contest” by a defendant of a speciﬁc 
element of a charged offense before other-acts evidence is admitted to 
prove it. In addition, an amendment could seek to eliminate or curtail 
widespread use of the vague “inextricably intertwined” doctrine and to 
channel more of a criminal defendant’s past misdeeds through the ap-
propriate Rule 404(b) analysis. 
Although many of these possibilities sound appealing, they may be 
difficult to capture in rule text and may prove problematic in practice. 
Adding new terminology like “propensity inference” and “active con-
test,” foreign to the Federal Rules of Evidence, could invite costly and 
time-intensive litigation over the proper meaning and application of such 
standards. Even more importantly, however, amendments that add hard-
and-fast, mechanical requirements to Rule 404(b) would be incompatible 
with the ﬂexible, case-by-case approach that has been the foundation for 
Rule 404(b) analysis.16 
                                                                                                                           
course, admitting evidence that a criminal defendant has committed a prior act of sexual 
assault or child molestation in a criminal case accusing the defendant of similar acts poses 
signiﬁcant risks to the criminal defendant as well. See generally Jeffrey Waller, Comment, 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415: “Laws Are Like Medicine; They Generally Cure an Evil 
by a Lesser . . . Evil,” 30 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1503 (1999) (describing the debate 
surrounding the enactment of Rules 413 through 415 and the risks to criminal defendants 
in particular). The Advisory Committee was unsuccessful in limiting the liberal admissi-
bility of such evidence through Federal Rules of Evidence 413 through 415 when they 
were proposed by Congress. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the 
Judicial Conference on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual 
Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995) (“After careful study, the Judicial Conference 
urges Congress to reconsider its decision on the policy questions underlying the new 
rules.”). The recent trend in federal cases to restrict access to other-acts evidence admitted 
through Rule 404(b) in criminal cases is consistent with the existing language of Rule 
404(b) and with the intent in enacting the Rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (providing 
that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act “to prove a person’s character” to show that 
the person acted in accordance with that character is “[p]rohibited”). While perceived 
problems with the admissibility of other-acts evidence in sex offense cases are unlikely to 
be addressed by rulemakers due to the congressional mandate in that arena, a modi-
ﬁcation to Rule 404(b) could capture the trend in the federal circuit courts and restore 
that Rule to its intended exclusionary purpose. Given the frequency with which other-acts 
evidence is admitted through Rule 404(b) in federal criminal cases, there is some urgency 
to deﬁne the proper application of that Rule. Compare Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom 
Criminal Evidence, supra note 3 (discussing the frequent use of Rule 404(b) evidence) 
with Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1487, 1490 (2005) (noting “that rape and child abuse are 
usually prosecuted as state crimes” and “almost all of the nonmilitary federal cases inter-
preting . . . Rules [413 and 414] arise in Indian Country”). 
 16. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule (noting 
that “[n]o mechanical solution is offered” to the question of other-acts evidence and that 
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Another potential amendment to Rule 404(b) that has not been sug-
gested by recent federal precedent could provide an optimal and elegant 
solution that would permit the admission of other-acts evidence in appro-
priate circumstances but preserve the prohibition on propensity evidence 
and bad-character reasoning. Rather than leaving the admission of other-
acts evidence to the Rule 403 balancing test, which favors admissibility, 
Rule 404(b)(2) could be amended to require a more protective 
balancing test when the government offers other-acts evidence against a 
criminal defendant. An amendment could demand that the probative 
value of a criminal defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered for a 
proper noncharacter purpose, such as intent, outweigh its prejudicial 
effect to that defendant. This balancing would favor exclusion by 
dictating rejection of other-acts evidence in cases when its probative 
value fails to eclipse the unfair prejudice suffered by a criminal 
defendant whose past misdeeds are revealed to the jury. This would 
eliminate the current characterization of Rule 404(b) in many federal 
circuit courts as a rule of “inclusion.” This shift in favor of criminal 
defendants would encourage more careful scrutiny of other-acts evidence 
to ensure that it responds to a live dispute at trial and to guard against 
propensity inferences. 
A test that requires probative value to overcome unfair prejudice 
would also necessitate a more speciﬁc and realistic assessment of the prej-
udice likely to result from admission of a particular defendant’s past 
misdeeds than federal courts traditionally undertake. Crucially, a more 
protective balancing test offers a ﬂexible solution that will not tie the 
hands of district court judges when other-acts evidence is needed to re-
spond to a defense. Unlike terms such as “propensity inference” and 
“active contest,” this protective balancing test is very familiar to litigants 
and judges who already apply it in the context of evaluating admissibility 
of a criminal defendant’s felony convictions for impeachment purposes 
under Rule 609(a)(1).17 A more protective balancing test for criminal de-
fendants facing other-acts evidence, therefore, has much to recommend, 
and is easily added to the text of Rule 404(b). 
Part I of this Article will set out the structure of Rule 404(b) and 
offer a brief history of the Rule. Part II will describe the traditional 
approach to other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b), which liberally ad-
mits prior bad acts of criminal defendants. Part III will showcase recent 
efforts in some circuit courts to restrict the traditional permissive ap-
proach to other-acts evidence and to impose more rigorous barriers to 
admissibility. Part IV will set forth and discuss drafting alternatives the 
Advisory Committee is currently considering, which would codify the 
                                                                                                                           
the determination must be made on a case-by-case balancing of the evidence’s probative 
value and prejudicial effect). 
 17. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B) (providing for exclusion of prior convictions 
offered to impeach the criminal defendant’s character for truthfulness unless the prior 
convictions’ probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect). 
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recent common law developments under Rule 404(b)—but which could 
also raise problems of interpretation and application. Part V will propose 
the addition of a more protective balancing test to Federal Rule 404(b) 
that would apply when other-acts evidence is offered against a criminal 
defendant. Part V will further illustrate how a more protective balancing 
test would resolve many of the current shortcomings in the contem-
porary application of Rule 404(b), while still paving the way for ad-
mission of important government evidence. 
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF RULE 404 
Fundamental to the adversary system is the principle that a person 
should be convicted for what she has done and not for who she is.18 Prior 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, American courts prohibited evidence 
of a person’s character to prove her conduct on a relevant occasion.19 
The rule with respect to other-acts evidence was truly one designed to ex-
clude character evidence, forbidding evidence of uncharged crimes, 
wrongs, or acts unless offered for a proper noncharacter purpose.20 
In keeping with this tradition, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) ex-
cludes evidence of “a person’s character or character trait” to prove 
conduct consistent with that character on a speciﬁc occasion.21 This 
means, for example, that a prosecutor cannot seek to prove that a de-
fendant committed a particular assault by showing that the defendant is 
generally a “violent” person. Rule 404(b)(1) ensures that the prohibition 
on character evidence extends beyond generalized character traits to a 
person’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts, banning evidence of past mis-
deeds as proof of charged misconduct.22 Thus, a prosecutor cannot seek 
                                                                                                                           
 18. 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:21, 
Westlaw (database updated through June 2017) (“[A] defendant should not be convicted 
because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of his 
guilt of the particular crime charged.”). 
 19. See Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 907 
(stating that, at common law, most courts subscribed to an “exclusionary conception” of 
the uncharged misconduct doctrine); see also Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the 
Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 
Harv. J. Racial & Ethnic Just. 1, 33 (2016) (discussing the varied and inconsistent history of 
uncharged misconduct evidence and suggesting that Rule 404(b) reﬂects a combination 
of an American common law trend of exclusion and a liberal English approach); Milich, 
supra note 9, at 777 (“The traditional common law rule prohibited use of the accused’s 
bad character or prior, unrelated misconduct to suggest that he or she therefore was more 
likely guilty of the crime charged.”). 
 20.  See Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 907 
(laying out exceptions to the general presumption against admitting evidence of other 
conduct); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (“The state may 
not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, speciﬁc criminal acts, or ill name among 
his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity 
a probable perpetrator of the crime.”). 
 21. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). 
 22. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
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to prove that a defendant committed a charged assault by offering 
evidence that the defendant has committed similar assaults on previous 
occasions. 
Rule 404(b)(2) recognizes, however, that uncharged acts can have 
an important bearing on issues in a case beyond simply demonstrating an 
individual’s propensity to behave in a certain way. Rule 404(b)(2) thus 
provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible 
for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”23 As noted by the Supreme Court, “Extrinsic acts evidence may 
be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, es-
pecially when that issue involves the actor’s state of mind and the only 
means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from 
conduct.”24 Another classic example of admissible other-acts evidence 
would be a criminal defendant’s previous crime spree to demonstrate his 
motivation for shooting at a police officer pursuing him for those of-
fenses.25 Rather than suggesting some criminal propensity that would 
make a violent act generally more likely, the prior crime spree would 
demonstrate the history between the officer and the defendant, and the 
defendant’s reasons for the shooting. 
In Huddleston v. United States, the Supreme Court outlined the 
proper methodology for determining the admissibility of evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts.26 The Court set out a 
four-part test, which has been utilized with some linguistic modiﬁcations 
across the federal circuit courts.27 First, the court must determine 
whether the proffered other-acts evidence has a “proper purpose” other 
than demonstrating a person’s propensity to behave in a certain man-
ner.28 Because Rule 404(b)(2) provides for admissibility for purposes 
“such as” those listed in the Rule, a proper purpose may be one of those 
enumerated in Rule 404(b)(2) or any other proper, noncharacter pur-
pose identiﬁed by the proponent or the court.29 Second, the court must 
determine the relevance of the other act to such a proper purpose.30 This 
step involves assessing the chain of inferences that leads from the other 
act to its purpose in proving motive or opportunity, for example, to 
ensure that the evidence has some tendency beyond simple propensity to 
                                                                                                                           
 23. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
 24. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). 
 25. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 904 (noting 
that evidence that a defendant stole a pistol used in a murder a month before the murder 
could be offered in the murder prosecution under Rule 404(b)). 
 26. 485 U.S. at 691–92. 
 27. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 4:29 (noting some federal circuit 
courts “more-or-less rephrase Huddleston without departing from it”). 
 28. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691. 
 29. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
 30. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691. 
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demonstrate that purpose. Third, the trial court should perform a 
traditional Rule 403 balancing to determine that the probative value of 
the other crime, wrong, or act for the proffered proper purpose is not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, namely a chain 
of bad-character reasoning.31 Finally, if the court determines that the 
other-acts evidence can be admitted after Rule 403 balancing, the court 
should offer the opponent of the evidence an appropriate limiting 
instruction restricting the other-acts evidence to its proper purpose.32 
The Supreme Court also held that any dispute over whether a defendant 
actually committed the other act is a Rule 104(b) issue of conditional 
relevance: That condition is met if a reasonable jury could ﬁnd by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other 
act.33 
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO RULE 404(B) IN FEDERAL COURT 
Notwithstanding the seemingly rigorous four-step analysis of other-
acts evidence articulated by the Supreme Court, federal courts have 
grown increasingly permissive in allowing the admission of other-acts 
evidence.34 As the following section sets out, federal courts routinely 
admit the previous uncharged misdeeds of criminal defendants, threat-
ening to undermine the bedrock ban on character evidence. 
Typically, a court presented with a Rule 404(b) objection takes three 
quick steps: 1) emphasize that Rule 404(b) is a rule of “inclusion” and 
not exclusion;35 2) ﬁnd that the proffered bad act is probative of one 
(and often more than one) noncharacter purpose, regardless of whether 
the defendant actually is contesting that purpose; and 3) declare sum-
marily that the probative value for the proper purpose is not “sub-
stantially outweighed” by unspecified prejudicial effect to the defendant.36 
                                                                                                                           
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 691–92. 
 33. Id. at 690. 
 34. See Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 907 
(noting liberal use of “plan” purpose by courts to admit similar acts that are merely bad-
character evidence); Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 4:28 (“[I]t is lamentably com-
mon to see recitations of laundry lists of permissive uses, with little analysis or attention to 
the particulars.”); Frank, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the “over-admission” of un-
charged act evidence through Rule 404(b)). 
 35. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 4:28 (noting the tendency among courts 
to treat Rule 404(b) as one of “inclusion” and emphasizing the beneﬁts of the contrary 
view that the Rule is one of “exclusion” and that “courts should be careful before admit-
ting such evidence”); see also United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(treating Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion); United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 395 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). 
 36. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual § 404.03, LexisNexis (database updated 2017) (summarizing numerous 
circuit court decisions that treat Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion” and ﬁnd bad acts 
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One of literally hundreds of examples of this traditional, “knee-jerk” 
approach to Rule 404(b) is found in United States v. Geddes.37 In Geddes, 
the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting sex trafficking by 
force, fraud, or coercion.38 At trial, the defense moved to exclude testi-
mony that he had physically assaulted and threatened to kill a former 
girlfriend in an unrelated incident because of a text message that he 
found on her phone.39 The trial court overruled the objection and 
allowed the testimony.40 Following his conviction, Geddes appealed the 
admission of the testimony regarding the previous assault and threat, 
claiming Rule 404(b) error.41 
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by stating that there is no error 
under Rule 404(b) “unless the evidence clearly had no bearing on the 
case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to 
commit criminal acts.”42 The court continued by explaining that Rule 
404(b) is a rule “of inclusion rather than exclusion and admits evidence 
of other crimes or acts relevant to any issue in the trial, unless it tends to 
prove only criminal disposition.”43 The court found that the defendant’s 
previous threat and assault of a former girlfriend were probative of 
“knowledge” and “intent,” both of which were relevant to the charged 
crime because the prosecution was required to prove both knowing trans-
portation in interstate commerce and intent to coerce under the relevant 
statute.44 Those elements were at issue, according to the court, simply 
because the defendant pled not guilty to the charges of aiding and 
abetting sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. Finally, the court 
concluded that the risk of prejudice to the defendant did not substan-
tially outweigh the value of proving knowledge and intent, particularly 
because a limiting instruction had been given to the jury.45 
The Rule 404(b) analysis in Geddes is inconsistent with the original 
intent of Rule 404(b) for a number of reasons. First, the defendant’s 
threat to kill his former girlfriend is relevant to prove his “intent” to 
coerce the alleged victim four years later only if one proceeds through a 
propensity chain of inferences. Reasoning that, “if the defendant had an 
                                                                                                                           
admissible, even if the purported proper purpose is not actively contested and that pur-
pose depends upon a character inference). 
 37. 844 F.3d 983, 989–91 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 38. Id. at 987. 
 39. Id. at 989. 
 40. Id. at 987–88. 
 41. Id. at 988. 
 42. Id. at 989 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 
796 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2015)). 
 43. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 538 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 44. Id. at 990; see also Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 
3, § 907 (noting that “intent” is the most commonly utilized purpose for admitting other-
acts evidence). 
 45. Geddes, 844 F.3d at 990–91. 
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intent to hurt his girlfriend, it is more likely he had an intent to coerce 
the alleged victim,” is just another way of saying that the defendant’s 
threat to his girlfriend shows a propensity to threaten women. Thus, the 
bad act is not truly offered for a proper, nonpropensity purpose at all 
despite the court’s lip-service to “knowledge” and “intent.” Second, the 
defendant was not actively contesting his intent to aid and abet sex 
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. Instead, he argued that he never 
made any threat at all. If simply pleading not guilty is enough to put 
intent into issue for purposes of Rule 404(b), then virtually any act 
somewhat similar to the charged act will be admissible in every criminal 
case that proceeds to trial. Third, the court’s statement that the gov-
ernment overcomes a Rule 404(b) objection by coming up with any 
nonpropensity purpose for which evidence is at all relevant ignores the 
work that Rule 403 is supposed to do when the probative value for the 
nonpropensity purpose is weak. Finally, the Geddes court’s character-
ization of Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion”46 mischaracterizes the rule 
and ignores its inherently exclusionary purpose, which demands the 
rejection of bad-acts evidence offered to prove propensity. 
The thin analysis in Geddes is regrettably common. A similar cavalier 
approach to other-acts evidence can be found in the tale of two Smiths. 
Defendant Erick Smith was charged with conspiracy to distribute and 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine arising out of a 
drug operation in Pensacola, Florida.47 At trial, the defendant objected to 
the government’s admission of his two prior drug convictions.48 Both 
were for mere possession of cocaine (and not for distribution or pos-
session with intent to distribute cocaine) and occurred six and ten years 
prior to the conduct charged in the indictment.49 Smith argued that Rule 
404(b) prohibited admission of his prior convictions because the con-
victions were not probative of any material issue in his case “other than 
character.”50 After the trial court admitted the evidence and he was con-
victed, Smith appealed.51 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by emphasizing that “Rule 
404(b) is a rule of inclusion” and that Rule “404(b) evidence . . . should 
not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.”52 
The court continued by highlighting circuit precedent providing that a 
defendant’s not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case “makes intent a 
material issue and opens the door to admission of prior drug-related 
                                                                                                                           
 46. See id. at 989. 
 47. United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1214–15 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 48. Id. at 1225. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1213–14. 
 52. Id. at 1225 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
2018] CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 781 
offenses.”53 The court explained that even old convictions for mere pos-
session of drugs could be probative of a defendant’s later “intent to 
distribute” when the same drug is involved in both the charged and un-
charged acts.54 Thus, the court upheld the admission of the defendant’s 
previous possession convictions without explaining how they demon-
strated his intent to distribute apart from showing his character.55 
A different Smith, Mario Ronrico Smith, was charged with 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, using and carrying a ﬁrearm 
during a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a 
ﬁrearm after he was stopped by a law enforcement officer with two kilo-
grams of cocaine, $6,000 in cash, and a Glock .40 caliber handgun in his 
car.56 Because defendant Smith ﬂed the scene of the traffic stop and was 
apprehended eighteen months later, his principal defense at trial related 
to his identity: He claimed that he was not the driver of the stopped 
vehicle carrying the contraband.57 At trial the government admitted, over 
Smith’s objection, his eight-year-old prior conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine on the theory that it “ﬁt a pattern of intent or 
knowledge under Rule 404(b).”58 
On appeal, Smith argued that his prior conviction was not relevant 
to prove “intent” or “knowledge” when “the sole dispute in th[e] case” 
was whether “Smith was the driver.”59 In rejecting this argument and af-
ﬁrming Smith’s conviction, the court characterized Smith’s defense to 
the current charges as a “general-denial defense,” stating that the Eighth 
Circuit has “long recognized that a general-denial defense places ‘intent 
or state of mind into question and allow[s] the admission of prior crim-
inal convictions to prove both knowledge and intent.’”60 The court found 
that, although the prior conviction was eight years old at the time of trial, 
“it was not so remote in time as to be inadmissible.”61 Thus, the court 
quickly found evidence of defendant Smith’s prior drug offense ad-
missible under Rule 404(b), although his defense did not dispute his 
knowledge of drugs or intent to distribute them, and despite the fact that 
the prior offense demonstrated intent only by way of an inference about 
Smith’s propensity to sell drugs.62 
                                                                                                                           
 53. Id. (quoting United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1332 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 54. Id. at 1226. 
 55. See id. 
 56. United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 57. Id. at 927–28. 
 58. Id. at 927. 
 59. Id. at 930. 
 60. Id. (quoting United States v. Foster, 344 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Trogdon, 575 
F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
 62. Id. Several cases have held similarly. For instance, in United States v. LaFontaine, 
the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for making a threat in a 2015 call to the 
Department of Justice, stating that Rule 404(b) is “one of inclusion, such that evidence 
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Another common technique employed by many federal courts in ad-
mitting prior uncharged acts against a criminal defendant is to ﬁnd those 
acts “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense and, thus, im-
mune from Rule 404(b) scrutiny altogether.63 Of course, Rule 404(b)(1) 
serves only to prohibit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts and 
does not apply to the acts comprising the charged offense.64 The 
                                                                                                                           
offered for permissible purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary determination.” 
847 F.3d 974, 981–82 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Contreras, 816 F.3d 502, 511 (8th Cir. 2016)). Further, the court held that the 
trial judge did not commit an abuse of discretion when he admitted a 2013 call by the 
defendant to a federal court employee, because he concluded that the earlier call was rel-
evant to “intent,” which was the key issue in the case. Id; see also United States v. Thomas, 
847 F.3d 193, 207–08 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming the defendant’s convictions for theft and 
ﬁnding no plain error in the admission of evidence of defendant’s actions prior to the 
crime charged when it “lessen[ed] the likelihood that [Thomas] committed the charged 
offense with innocent intent” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 736 (5th Cir. 2015))); United States v. 
Khan, 771 F.3d 367, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting evidence of prior uncharged acts since “the risk of unfair prejudice 
did not substantially outweigh the [evidence’s] probative value”); United States v. Roux, 
715 F.3d 1019, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 2013) (ﬁnding other-acts evidence admissible upon 
considering its “relative probative value and prejudicial effect”); United States v. Douglas, 
482 F.3d 591, 596–600 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ﬁnding evidence of defendant’s prior arrest ad-
missible since it went to “knowledge or intent” even if it “may also suggest criminal 
propensity”); United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (ﬁnding 
that the “probative value” of a prior conviction did not result in “disproportionate pre-
judice”); United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (8th Cir. 1997) (ﬁnding evidence 
of a prior act admissible to determine intent or motivation). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that evidence that one defendant supported a terrorist group before it was designated as a 
terrorist organization was “intrinsic” to the crime charged because it explained how the 
fundraising began); United States v. Castleman, 795 F.3d 904, 915 (8th Cir. 2015) (char-
acterizing, in a drug prosecution, evidence of death threats against witnesses, offered to 
prove consciousness of guilt, as “‘direct evidence of the crime charged’” and so “not sub-
ject to a Rule 404(b) analysis” (quoting United States v. Zierke, 618 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 
2010))); United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1394 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that com-
mon methods used by the defendant to commit fraud were “intrinsic” because they were 
similar to the charged offenses); United States v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 880, 887–88 (8th Cir. 
2014) (relying upon the inextricably intertwined theory to uphold admission of other-acts 
evidence); United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116, 1124–25 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); 
United States v. Collins, 779 F.2d 1520, 1531–32 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[E]vidence of criminal 
activity other than the charged offense is not extrinsic act evidence . . . [if it] was 
inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offense . . . .”); United States v. 
Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that Rule 404(b) does not apply 
when the evidence concerns “context, motive, and set-up of the crime” and is “linked in 
time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of 
an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story”). 
 64. See Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, §§ 903–904 
(suggesting a critical distinction between acts “intrinsic” to a charged offense because they 
are “part and parcel of the charged offense” and acts that are inextricably intertwined with 
the charged offense because “redacting the references to the uncharged crime would 
render the testimony . . . linguistically or psychologically incomprehensible”); Mueller & 
Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 4:29 (stating that “intrinsic acts” not covered by Rule 404(b) 
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Committee Note to the 1991 amendment to Rule 404(b) delineates be-
tween acts that are covered by Rule 404(b) because they are “extrinsic” 
to the charged offense and those that are not governed by the rule be-
cause they are “intrinsic” to the charged offense.65 Although there is an 
obvious need for line drawing in applying Rule 404(b), many federal 
courts simply label uncharged offenses offered against criminal defen-
dants as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense whenever 
they are in any way related to the charged offense. By utilizing this vague 
and conclusory characterization, these courts sidestep the careful Rule 
404(b) analysis dictated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Huddleston.66 
In United States v. Ford, for example, the defendant was charged with 
multiple counts of mail fraud, false claims, and identity theft based upon 
her ﬁling of fraudulent tax returns in the names of speciﬁc homeless or 
disabled victims.67 At trial, Ford objected to government testimony from 
nine victims who were not included in the indictment and to testimony 
from an undercover reporter concerning the defendant’s uncharged 
video-recorded solicitation of the reporter.68 Ford objected that all of this 
testimony amounted to evidence of uncharged misconduct that could 
not survive Rule 404(b) scrutiny.69 Following the admission of all of this 
testimony by the trial court and Ford’s conviction, she appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit explained that “Rule 404(b) is the wrong place 
to begin the analysis” of the defendant’s claim.70 The court noted that a 
defendant’s uncharged conduct “is admissible as intrinsic evidence out-
side the scope of Rule 404(b)” whenever the conduct is part of the “same 
scheme or series of transactions and uses the same modus operandi.”71 
Thus, the evidence of nine uncharged fraudulent tax returns and identity 
thefts, as well as evidence of a fraudulent solicitation of an undercover 
                                                                                                                           
should include “acts of planning and preparation as well as execution and concealment of 
the charged crime”). 
 65. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (adding 
a notice requirement and explaining that the notice requirement “does not extend to 
evidence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’ to the charged offense” (citing United States v. 
Williams, 900 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1990))); see also Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal 
Evidence, supra note 3, § 903 (noting that Rule 404(b) applies only to “extrinsic acts” that 
do not constitute part of the charged offense and not to “intrinsic acts” that form part of 
the charged offense); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae: A 
Procedural Approach to Untangling the “Inextricably Intertwined” Theory for Admitting 
Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 719, 733–34 (2010) 
[hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Second Coming] (noting that Rule 404(b)’s 1991 amend-
ment does not apply to acts which are “intrinsic” to the charged offense). 
 66. See supra notes 24–33 and accompanying text. 
 67. 784 F.3d at 1390. 
 68. Id. at 1394–95. 
 69. Id. at 1391. 
 70. Id. at 1394. 
 71. Id. 
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reporter, was admissible against the defendant without any Rule 404(b) 
analysis at all. Although the court may have upheld the admissibility of at 
least some of the uncharged fraudulent acts using a Rule 404(b) analysis, 
the court’s quick reference to “intrinsic” acts “inextricably intertwined” 
with the charged offense bypassed Rule 404(b) scrutiny altogether.72 
The analysis becomes even more confusing in courts that have more 
than one doctrine for determining whether the bad acts are “other” acts 
covered by Rule 404(b).73 Consider United States v. Loftis, a wire fraud 
prosecution in which the government sought interlocutory relief after 
the trial judge ruled that evidence of frauds not speciﬁed in the 
indictment would be evaluated under Rule 404(b).74 The court held that 
Rule 404(b) did not apply for two reasons. First, the frauds not speciﬁed 
in the indictment were not “other” acts because the crime charged in-
cluded not only the speciﬁc executions of the fraud scheme alleged in 
the indictment but also the “overall scheme.”75 Second, the uncharged 
frauds were “inextricably intertwined” with the frauds speciﬁed in the 
indictment because “they [were] ‘part of the same transaction’ as the 
charged transactions.”76 The court did not explain why it engaged with 
two separate doctrines to ﬁnd this evidence to be outside Rule 404(b) 
given the similar reasoning supporting both.77 
United States v. Hilgeford is another prime example of how courts uti-
lize vague references to “inextricably intertwined” acts to sidestep the 
                                                                                                                           
 72. See Imwinkelried, The Second Coming, supra note 65, at 726 (“In many of the 
cases in which courts have invoked the [inextricably intertwined] doctrine, they could just 
as easily have relied on a recognized noncharacter theory, such as motive.”). 
 73. Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Spring 2017 Meeting Agenda 323 (Apr. 
21, 2017) [hereinafter Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda], http://www. 
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_on_rules_of_evidence_-_spring_ 
2017_meeting_materials.pdf [http://perma.cc/H24X-ELQB]. 
 74. 843 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 75. Id. at 1176. 
 76. Id. at 1178. For another example, see United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 
1345 (7th Cir. 1993) (“When deciding if the ‘other acts’ evidence was admissible without 
reference to Rule 404(b), we must determine whether such evidence was ‘intricately re-
lated to the facts of the case’ at hand.” (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 929 F.2d 316, 
320 (7th Cir. 1991))). Of course, Rule 403 will still apply to the evidence. See id. (“If we 
ﬁnd the evidence is so related, the only limitation on the admission of such evidence is the 
balancing test required by Rule 403.”). However, it would be the rare case in which proof 
of an inextricably intertwined act could be considered so prejudicial as to justify exclusion 
under Rule 403. 
 77. Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 323 (providing a 
summary of Loftis). In contrast, in some cases, courts need not engage at all in the 
“intrinsically intertwined” analysis because the bad-acts evidence is clearly part of the 
charged misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(holding the evidence of codefendant’s distribution of methamphetamine on October 26, 
1990, after Pace was arrested, to be admissible against Pace without regard to Rule 404(b) 
because the indictment charged Pace with conspiracy to attempt to manufacture and dis-
tribute methamphetamine/amphetamine that ended “on or about October 26, 1990”), 
abrogated by United States v. Kupfer, 797 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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appropriate Rule 404(b) analysis.78 Hilgeford borrowed over “one 
million dollars from a bank and the Farmer’s Home Administration 
(FmHA) using the two farms he owned as security for the debt.”79 After 
ﬁnancial problems “engulfed the defendant . . . the bank foreclosed on 
the mortgage it held on one of his farms.”80 The bank then bought the 
farm at the foreclosure sale and evicted Hilgeford.81 The United States 
foreclosed on his other farm.82 Hilgeford retaliated by sending bills to 
employees of the bank and the FmHA and then taking deductions on his 
tax returns for the unpaid bills.83 As a result, Hilgeford was charged with 
mail fraud and ﬁling false tax returns.84 To prove that the defendant’s 
conduct was willful, the government offered evidence that Hilgeford had 
generated “a blizzard of complicated and groundless litigation, primarily 
involving his fruitless attempts to regain his two farms” in the years prior 
to ﬁling the challenged tax returns.85 Hilgeford objected at trial under 
Rule 404(b).86 The court held that “evidence of defendant’s prior con-
duct is ‘intricately related’ or ‘inextricably tied’ to the facts in this case” 
and that therefore Rule 404(b) was not applicable.87 
Cases such as Hilgeford are even more suspect than fraud cases like 
Ford and Loftis, in which the bad acts occurred while the alleged scheme 
was ongoing. In Hilgeford, the bad acts did not occur within the time pe-
riod covered by the indictment.88 The fact that the groundless litigation 
was probative of willfulness, an element needed to convict for the charge 
of ﬁling false tax returns, does not immunize it against Rule 404(b) scru-
tiny. All evidence offered by the prosecution in a criminal trial must be 
somehow probative of an element of the crime.89 The court’s statement 
that the groundless litigation concerning the farms was “intricately 
related” to the tax counts90 ignores the reality that the litigation consti-
tuted uncharged bad acts by the defendant that needed to pass Rule 
404(b) muster. 
Ford, Loftis, and Hilgeford are hardly the only cases in which courts 
have been vague and conclusory in ﬁnding “inextricably intertwined” 
                                                                                                                           
 78. 7 F.3d at 1346. 
 79. Id. at 1341. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1342. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1344–45. 
 86. Id. at 1345. 
 87. Id. at 1346. 
 88. Id. at 1345–46 (discussing the defendant’s prior bad acts). 
 89. See id. at 1346 (holding that, despite Rule 404(b) not being applicable, the trial 
court must still determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect). 
 90. Id. 
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acts exempt from Rule 404(b). Courts exacerbate the problem by using 
different phrases to capture the concept, such as acts that are “intrinsic” 
to the crime charged; acts that form part of a “single criminal episode”; 
acts that are an “integral part” of the crime; and acts that “complete[] 
the story” or “explain[] the context” of the crime.91 One well-known 
commentator has summed up the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine 
with the following criticism: 
“Inextricably intertwined” is the “modern de-Latinized” 
equivalent of res gestae, and it has been savaged by a similar 
critique. The standard has been described as “lack[ing] clarity” 
and “obscure,” because it does not embody a clear substantive 
principle. . . . The vacuous nature of the test’s wording gives 
courts license to employ sloppy analysis and allows them quickly 
to slip from a conclusory analysis to a desired conclusion. 
Simply stated, the indeﬁnite phrasing of the doctrine is a virtual 
invitation for abuse.92 
In sum, a review of federal case law governing the admissibility of un-
charged acts by criminal defendants reveals a disturbing pattern. Ap-
pellate courts routinely start from a faulty premise that Rule 404(b) is a 
“rule of inclusion,” which presumes admissibility of other-acts evidence. 
In many cases, reliance on inferences about a defendant’s propensity to 
engage in certain conduct is necessary and clear in the government’s 
purported purpose for offering evidence of uncharged misconduct. And 
this evidence is routinely admitted in cases in which the defendant has 
not disputed intent, knowledge, or motive beyond the simple act of 
pleading not guilty. Finally, many courts avoid even a cursory analysis of 
Rule 404(b) by characterizing the uncharged misconduct offered against 
a defendant as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense. All of 
these practices add up to a permissive culture of admissibility of un-
charged acts by criminal defendants that ﬂies in the face of Rule 404(b)’s 
ban on other-acts evidence.93 
                                                                                                                           
 91. See United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 237, 245–47 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting various courts’ iterations of the test and noting that 
“[w]hether evidence qualiﬁes as intrinsic in a particular case may well depend on which 
version of the test one employs”). 
 92. Imwinkelried, The Second Coming, supra note 65, at 729–30 (alteration in 
original) (footnotes omitted). 
 93. The appellate courts are not alone in their cursory treatment of other-acts 
evidence in criminal cases. District courts often give shallow treatment to Rule 404(b) 
analysis as well. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, No. 2:16-CR-261 TS, 2016 WL 7046747, at 
*2 (D. Utah Dec. 2, 2016) (“Defendant’s prior use of methamphetamine may be used to 
show knowledge, plan, motive or intent to participate in the alleged crimes. Therefore, the 
evidence is probative of a material issue other than character and is admissible.”); United 
States v. Shayota, No. 15-CR-00264-LHK, 2016 WL 5791376, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016) 
(“Defendants’ past history of working together on similar schemes indicates that they 
understood their roles as well as the objects of the conspiracy, and demonstrates how they 
gained knowledge, skills, and networks necessary to carry out the alleged 5-Hour ENERGY 
conspiracy.”). 
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III. THE RECENT RULE 404(B) CIRCUIT SPLIT: RECLAIMING THE 
PROHIBITION ON EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS 
Notwithstanding the traditionally permissive approach to other-acts 
evidence in federal criminal cases, some federal circuits have recently 
made efforts to limit the admission of other-acts evidence and to restore 
the promised prohibition on such potentially devastating character evi-
dence. The Seventh,94 Third,95 and Fourth Circuits96 have led a campaign 
to end the liberal admissibility of other-acts evidence in criminal cases by 
imposing limits on the prosecutorial use of such evidence. First, some 
federal courts have articulated a more nuanced historical view of Rule 
404(b) as a “rule of inclusion,” ﬁnding that this characterization does 
not signify the presumptive admissibility of other-acts evidence.97 Second, 
these circuit courts have articulated a total ban on the dreaded 
propensity inference, barring the admission of other-acts evidence when 
any link in the chain of inferences supporting the relevance of the other 
act depends on the defendant’s propensity to engage in certain con-
duct.98 Third, these circuit courts have analyzed the admissibility of 
other-acts evidence with an eye toward the defense advanced by the crim-
inal defendant, demanding the defendant’s “active contest” of an 
element of an offense to which the other-acts evidence is relevant.99 
Finally, federal courts have taken a hard look at the vague “inextricably 
intertwined” doctrine that has allowed other-acts evidence to escape Rule 
404(b) scrutiny, either outlawing the doctrine or severely curtailing it. 
A.  Recasting Rule 404(b) as a Rule of Exclusion 
Nothing is more common than to see a federal circuit court begin 
an analysis of the admissibility of other-acts evidence by stating that Rule 
404(b) is a “rule of inclusion.”100 Right out of the gate, this characterization 
                                                                                                                           
 94. See infra notes 116–124, 155–161, 189–196 and accompanying text. 
 95. See infra notes 101–109, 125–131, 140–152, 162–165, 171–188 and accompanying 
text. 
 96. See infra notes 132–139 and accompanying text. 
 97. See infra section III.A. 
 98. See infra section III.B. 
 99. See infra section III.C. 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 404(b) 
is a rule of inclusion, and we will reverse only when such evidence clearly had no bearing 
on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit 
criminal acts.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Trogdon, 575 
F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2009))); United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1225 (11th Cir. 
2013) (“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and ‘404(b) evidence, like other relevant evi-
dence, should not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.’” 
(quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003))); United States 
v. Douglas, 482 F.3d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Indeed, ‘Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion 
rather than exclusion’ ‘prohibiting the admission of other crimes evidence “in but one cir-
cumstance”—for the purpose of proving that a person’s actions conformed to his char-
acter.’” (citation omitted) (ﬁrst quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929–30 
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serves as a foundation for the permissive approach these courts have taken 
to other-acts evidence in federal criminal cases. Recently, other circuits 
have articulated an arguably more historically accurate take on what it 
means for Rule 404(b) to be a “rule of inclusion.” These courts have 
stated that Rule 404(b) is “inclusive” only to the extent that it allows evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts to be admitted for relevant pro-
per purposes beyond those spelled out in the non-exhaustive Rule 
404(b)(2) list. 
In United States v. Caldwell, the Third Circuit performed an in-depth 
analysis of the origins of the “rule of inclusion” characterization of Rule 
404(b).101 The court found that all American courts throughout the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries agreed that evidence of other acts, 
relevant only to show a defendant’s “general propensity to commit the 
charged offense,” was inadmissible.102 Although there was a debate as to 
whether the common law rule was “exclusionary” or “inclusionary,” the 
debate “concerned whether the list of previously recognized non-pro-
pensity purposes was exhaustive (or ‘exclusive’), or whether any non-pro-
pensity purpose, even if not previously recognized, could support 
admission of the prior act evidence (the ‘inclusive’ approach).”103 
The Caldwell court found that this debate over the list of available 
proper purposes for other-acts evidence was resolved in 1975 with the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.104 The drafters of Rule 404(b) 
elected to introduce the list of proper purposes with the words “such 
as.”105 The Third Circuit recognized that in so doing, “the drafters made 
clear that the list was not exclusive or otherwise limited to a strictly de-
ﬁned class.”106 The court explained that any reference to Rule 404(b) as 
a “rule of inclusion” merely refers to the drafter’s decision not to limit 
the potentially proper purposes for other-acts evidence.107 
Therefore, the Third Circuit clariﬁed that characterizing Rule 
404(b) as a “rule of inclusion” does not signify the presumptive admissi-
bility of prior bad-acts evidence. Rather, the Third Circuit emphasized: 
On this point, let us be clear: Rule 404(b) is a rule of general 
exclusion, and carries with it “no presumption of admissibility.” 
The Rule reﬂects the revered and longstanding policy that, 
                                                                                                                           
(D.C. Cir. 2000); then quoting United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 
1998))). 
 101. 760 F.3d 267, 275 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (citing David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: 
Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events § 4.3.2, at 224 (Richard D. Friedman 
ed., 2009) (“[T]he real question is . . . whether the courts actually conﬁne admissibility to 
a set of enumerated purposes.”)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
 106. Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276. 
 107. Id. 
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under our system of justice, an accused is tried for what he did, 
not who he is. And in recognition that prior offense evidence is 
generally more prejudicial than probative, Rule 404(b) directs 
that evidence of prior bad acts be excluded—unless the propo-
nent can demonstrate that the evidence is admissible for a non-
propensity purpose.108 
To the Caldwell court, therefore, Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion 
simply means that the list of proper purposes in the rule is not 
exclusive.109 Cases like Caldwell have helped restrict the frequent 
admission of other-acts evidence by challenging the traditional inter-
pretation of Rule 404(b) as a “rule of inclusion”—in Geddes and like 
cases—that treats Rule 404(b) as a rule providing for presumptive admis-
sibility of uncharged misconduct. Instead, cases like Caldwell have placed 
the “rule of inclusion” language in its proper historical context and have 
restored the presumptive exclusion of prior uncharged acts by criminal 
defendants. 
B.  Prohibiting Propensity 
Although Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent convictions based upon 
a criminal defendant’s propensity to behave in certain ways, many federal 
courts simply look to ﬁnd probative value for the proper purpose cited by 
the prosecution without investigating whether that probative value relies 
on a propensity inference. Exemplary is United States v. Matthews, a case in 
which the defendant’s prior uncharged drug transaction was held pro-
perly admitted to prove his intent to conspire to commit drug transac-
tions.110 Speciﬁcally, the court held that even prior convictions for posses-
sion of cocaine for personal use are relevant and admissible to prove a 
defendant’s intent to distribute cocaine on a separate occasion.111 Judge 
Tjoﬂat concurred specially, arguing that the court had failed to explain 
how the probative value of the prior drug activity actually proceeded 
through a nonpropensity inference: 
                                                                                                                           
 108. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 
Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 731 (4th ed. 2013)). 
 109. Other courts have recognized this same understanding of the Caldwell decision. 
See United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that the 
“characterization of Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion does not render prior convictions 
presumptively admissible” (citing Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276)); United States v. Repak, 852 
F.3d 230, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2017) (reiterating that Rule 404(b) is a rule of “exclusion”); 
Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 907 (noting that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is “inclusionary” only because the list of proper purposes 
is illustrative and not exclusive). 
 110. 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005). For other examples, see United States v. 
Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1179 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence of prior possession of 
drugs was probative of knowledge and intent to distribute, with no analysis of how the bad 
act was probative for those purposes independent of any propensity inference); United 
States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that evidence of defendant’s 
prior conviction for cocaine possession was relevant to show intent). 
 111. Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1311. 
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It is difficult to argue that a person had an intention to do 
something on a particular occasion because he or she demon-
strated that intention previously without implicitly suggesting 
that the person has a proclivity towards that intent . . . . If the 
inferential chain must run through the defendant’s character—
and his or her predisposition towards a criminal intent—the ev-
idence is squarely on the propensity side of the elusive line. 
Where, on the other hand, an inference can be drawn that says 
nothing about the defendant’s character—for example, based 
on the “improbability of coincidence”—the evidence is more 
appropriately admissible for non-propensity purposes.112 
Most of the cases involving bad acts that proceed through a pro-
pensity inference are, like Matthews, cases involving use of prior drug 
activity, with the prosecution arguing that the prior drug activity is of-
fered for intent.113 Many have argued that bad acts offered to prove 
“intent” cannot be readily separated from the propensity inference.114 
But the problem of using propensity inferences for so-called proper pur-
poses occurs for other purposes as well, such as identity and motive.115 
In keeping with Judge Tjoﬂat’s Matthews concurrence, some federal 
circuit courts have recently held that in assessing probative value of 
other-acts evidence, the court must assure itself that the inferences to be 
derived from the act are independent of any propensity inference. The lead-
ing example of the more careful approach is the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Gomez.116 In Gomez, the government had evi-
dence that someone nicknamed “Guero” was a reseller of cocaine.117 Al-
though the government claimed that Gomez was Guero, Gomez claimed 
that his brother-in-law was Guero.118 Over the defendant’s objection, the 
trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior cocaine possession 
                                                                                                                           
 112. Id. at 1313 n.1 (Tjoﬂat, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). For a 
similar argument, see Daniel P. Ranaldo, Is Every Drug User a Drug Dealer? Federal 
Circuit Courts Are Split in Applying Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 8 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 147, 150–51 
(2014) (noting the dispute in federal courts on whether prior acts of possession are 
probative of intent to distribute and characterizing the difference as whether or not the 
court is considering whether the probative value for intent proceeds through a propensity 
inference). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 114. See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 10, at 218 (“What chain of reasoning can link 
the prior drug history . . . to the charged crime other than one that infers that the 
defendant has a drug-related propensity[?] . . . [E]arlier drug use, which is behavioral 
evidence, can be relevant only if we assume that the defendant’s behavior forms an 
unchanging pattern.” (quoting Morris, supra note 10, at 191–92)). 
 115. See United States v. Roux, 715 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]cts of abuse 
described by [minor sisters] CC and SH were probative of Roux’s motive to commit the 
charged child pornography offense . . . [because] ‘[p]rior instances of sexual misconduct 
with a child victim may establish a defendant’s sexual interest in children . . . .’” (quoting 
United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2006))). 
 116. 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 117. Id. at 850. 
 118. Id. at 862. 
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for the purpose of proving the defendant’s “identity” as “Guero.”119 In 
reversing Gomez’s conviction, the circuit court stated: 
[T]he district court should not just ask whether the proposed 
other-act evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but 
how exactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose—or more spe-
ciﬁcally, how the evidence is relevant without relying on a pro-
pensity inference. Careful attention to these questions will help 
identify evidence that serves no permissible purpose.120 
The Gomez court held that the trial court improperly admitted evi-
dence of the defendant’s cocaine possession because it suggested defen-
dant’s identity as “Guero” only by way of a propensity inference.121 The 
court explained as follows: 
Gomez’s mistaken-identity defense singled out another 
person—his brother-in-law and housemate Victor Reyes—as the 
“real” Guero. The government introduced the user quantity of 
cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom for the purpose of showing 
that as between the two, it was more likely that Gomez was 
Guero. . . . [But] the evidence of the defendant’s history of drug 
dealing tended to prove his identity as a participant in the 
charged drug deal only by way of a forbidden propensity infer-
ence: Once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer.122 
The court concluded that the government’s argument was not only 
“extraordinarily weak,” but also dependent on “pure propensity.”123 Ac-
cordingly, the full Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district 
court should not have admitted evidence of Gomez’s cocaine possession 
pursuant to Rule 404(b).124 
In United States v. Smith, the Third Circuit similarly held that prior 
misconduct must be excluded if the probative value for the expressed 
purpose rests on a propensity inference.125 In Smith, the defendant was 
charged with threatening a federal officer with a gun and possessing a 
ﬁrearm during a crime of violence.126 At trial, the government moved to 
admit evidence of the defendant’s prior drug dealing at the location of 
the charged offense, arguing that the evidence was probative of the 
                                                                                                                           
 119. Id. at 850. 
 120. Id. at 856 (second emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 863. 
 122. Id. at 862–63. 
 123. Id. at 863. 
 124. Id. But see United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 534 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(introducing evidence of drug-dealing as indicative of Schmitt’s motive to possess the 
ﬁrearm “provided a ‘propensity-free chain of reasoning’ for the evidence’s admission”) 
(quoting Gomez, 763 F.3d at 856)). 
 125. 725 F.3d 340, 342 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 126. Id. at 343. 
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defendant’s motive to commit the crime charged to protect his turf.127 
Accepting this argument, the trial court admitted the evidence.128 
Following Smith’s conviction, the circuit court stated that the admis-
sion of the prior bad-acts evidence “violates our long-standing require-
ment that . . . under Rule 404(b), the proponent must set forth ‘a chain 
of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because 
the defendant committed . . . offenses before, he therefore is more likely 
to have committed this one.’”129 The court rejected the government’s ar-
gument that the prior drug sale was admissible to show motive because 
“one must necessarily (a) assume something about Smith’s character 
based on the 2008 evidence (that he was a drug dealer) and (b) infer 
that Smith acted in conformity with that character in 2010 by dealing 
drugs and therefore had a motive to defend his turf.”130 Thus, the mere 
fact that the government articulated the noncharacter purpose of showing 
“motive” was not enough to admit the evidence for that purpose because 
the evidence was probative of motive only under the assumption that the 
defendant had a bad character.131 
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit joined the chorus denouncing reli-
ance on propensity inferences to support admission of Rule 404(b) 
evidence. In United States v. Hall, law enforcement officers searched a 
home in which the defendant resided and found six kilograms of mar-
ijuana, packaging materials, and three ﬁrearms inside a bedroom locked 
with a deadbolt.132 Following this search, the defendant was indicted for 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a ﬁrearm by 
a convicted felon, and possession of a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafﬁcking crime.133 Hall’s defense at trial was that his cousin was respon-
sible for the drugs and guns recovered from the residence and that he 
was not involved in the marijuana operation.134 Over the defendant’s ob-
jection, the district court permitted the government to introduce 
evidence of the defendant’s prior marijuana convictions at the close of its 
case-in-chief—one for possession of marijuana and three for possession 
                                                                                                                           
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 342. 
 129. Id. (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 130. Id. at 346. 
 131. For a similar example, see United States v. Steiner, in which the court reversed the 
defendant’s felon in possession of a ﬁrearm and ammunition conviction because the trial 
judge abused discretion in admitting evidence that an arrest warrant had been issued for 
the defendant’s failure to appear on an unrelated sexual assault charge as “background” 
evidence to show that the defendant was hiding out in the premises where the gun and 
ammunition were found. 847 F.3d 103, 106, 113 (3d Cir. 2017). There was no need for the 
“cavalier[]” use of background evidence in this case. Id. at 113. For another example, see 
United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2014) (rejecting admission of prior 
gun possession to show that defendant knew he actually possessed a gun). 
 132. 858 F.3d 254, 262 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 263. 
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with intent to distribute marijuana—to prove the defendant’s knowledge 
of marijuana and his intent to distribute the marijuana found in the 
locked bedroom.135 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hall’s conviction, ﬁnding 
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Hall’s prior con-
victions under Rule 404(b).136 The court found that the prior convictions 
were not linked to the present charges by similar circumstances or “tem-
poral proximity.”137 Because the prior convictions helped to render the 
defendant’s involvement in the charged marijuana distribution “more 
plausible” through “precisely the criminal propensity inference Rule 
404(b) is designed to forbid,” the court found that the prior convictions 
were not admissible to prove the defendant’s intent.138 Over a vehement 
dissent, the court found that the government failed to meet its burden of 
explaining its proper purpose and of presenting a “propensity-free chain 
of inferences supporting” that purpose.139 
In United States v. Repak, the Third Circuit ultimately approved the 
admission of prior uncharged acts by the defendant as consistent with its 
strict ban on the propensity inference but chastised the district court for 
failing to articulate with careful precision the nonpropensity reasoning 
supporting the admissibility of the evidence.140 The defendant in Repak 
was a public official charged with various public corruption offenses 
based upon his solicitation of goods and services from vendors in ex-
change for awarding them public contracts.141 The defendant’s principal 
defense was that he lacked the requisite mental state to inﬂuence the 
award of contracts based upon the provision of speciﬁc personal services 
charged in the indictment.142 The district court permitted the govern-
ment to admit evidence of other uncharged acts of solicitation of per-
sonal services by the defendant to contractors to show the defendant’s 
knowledge and corrupt intent.143 In so doing the district court provided 
paragraphs of analysis supporting the admission of the other-acts 
evidence, reasoning that “these [uncharged] business dealings and other 
solicitations will be used by the Government to establish Defendant’s 
knowledge as to the charges of extortion under color of official right and 
                                                                                                                           
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 264. 
 137. Id. at 260. 
 138. Id. at 275 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
 139. Id. at 277. 
 140. 852 F.3d 230, 242, 244 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that the district court’s analysis 
of the Rule 404(b) question is “inexact and fails to adequately link the other-acts evidence 
to a non-propensity purpose”). 
 141. Id. at 237. 
 142. Id. at 240. 
 143. Id. at 241. 
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his willful intent as to the charges of solicitation by a bribe.”144 The 
district court concluded that the “Government has presented a sufficient 
chain of inferences connecting these other acts to material facts in this 
case without implicating the evidentiary rules’ prohibition of using pro-
pensity evidence.”145 
On appeal of Repak’s conviction, the Third Circuit held that the un-
charged acts of solicitation were admissible under a proper Rule 404(b) 
analysis, but found the district court’s analysis of the evidence 
“lacking.”146 The court noted that other-acts evidence must ﬁt within a 
chain of inferences “no link of which is a forbidden propensity infer-
ence”147 and emphasized that this chain of reasoning must be articulated 
by the proponent and by the trial court with “careful precision.”148 The 
court noted the importance of articulating how exactly a prior act demon-
strates knowledge or intent, for example, to ensure that the evidence is 
“not susceptible to being used improperly by the jury.”149 Because the 
district court’s ruling failed to explain precisely how Repak’s uncharged 
solicitations tended to prove his intent with respect to the charged 
solicitations, the Third Circuit found that ruling to be “inexact” and an 
inadequate foundation for the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence.150 The 
court ultimately upheld the conviction and the admission of the 
uncharged acts of solicitation, however, ﬁnding that the defendant’s 
course of conduct with the same vendors over a relatively circumscribed 
time period made it more likely that he did not “unwittingly” receive 
personal services free of charge without intending to award contracts 
based on those services.151 Although the court upheld admission of the 
other-acts evidence, it emphasized that such evidence should be sub-
jected to rigorous testing and admonished trial courts to perform careful, 
precise, and exact analysis of such evidence prior to its admission.152 
To summarize, federal courts are deeply divided on how to deter-
mine the probative value of a criminal defendant’s prior bad act. Circuit 
courts sharply disagree on the need to assess whether the purported pro-
per purpose for a prior bad act depends upon a propensity inference 
that reﬂects on the defendant’s character. Although federal courts have 
long upheld the admission of other-acts evidence with ﬂeeting lip service 
to purported proper purposes, more recent circuit precedent demands a 
                                                                                                                           
 144. Id. (quoting United States v. Repak, No. 3:14-01, 2015 WL 4108309, at *5 (W.D. 
Pa. July 7, 2015)). 
 145. Id. at 242 (quoting Repak, 2015 WL 4108309, at *5). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 243 (quoting United States v. Davis, 276 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 148. Id. (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 244. 
 151. Id. at 246. 
 152. Id. at 248 (“The District Court’s application of Rule 403 to the Government’s 
other-acts evidence lacked the rigor this Court requires.”). 
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rigorous analysis that eschews any reliance on a defendant’s propensity to 
commit the charged offenses and places signiﬁcant demands on the trial 
court in evaluating the admissibility of other-acts evidence. 
C.  Putting Defendants in the Driver’s Seat: Requiring “Active Contest” 
The previous section demonstrates the difficulty and confusion in-
volved in distinguishing between state of mind and propensity. This diffi-
culty is especially salient when the government seeks to introduce bad-acts 
evidence to prove a defendant’s intent or knowledge.153 To mitigate 
prosecutorial abuse of bad-acts evidence offered to prove mental state, 
some courts prohibit the prosecution from admitting such evidence until 
it is apparent that the defendant is actively contesting the element of mental 
state.154 In United States v. Gomez, the Seventh Circuit described this 
“active contest” approach as a component of the Rule 403 analysis con-
ducted once a court has determined that there is a proper purpose for 
which the evidence is relevant without proceeding through a propensity 
inference.155 The “general guiding principle” recognized by the court is 
that “the degree to which the nonpropensity issue actually is disputed in 
the case will affect the probative value of the other-act evidence.”156 
The court recognized that trials involve varying “degrees of factual 
disagreement” that affect the application of this general principle.157 In 
some cases, a defendant might stipulate to a fact or element that other-
acts evidence tends to prove. In this situation, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that other-acts evidence “may have little probative value” and may be ex-
cluded.158 For trials involving general intent crimes, such as drug 
                                                                                                                           
 153. Professor David Sonenshein’s review of the social science literature on the effect 
of prior experience on conduct suggests that “[b]ecause social science is essentially united 
in rejecting even the logical relevance of similar acts evidence on intent, Rule 404(b) 
should be amended to exclude intent from its list of permissible offers.” Sonenshein, 
supra note 10, at 275. Sonenshein recognizes, however, that “this seemingly radical propo-
sal” might be “unacceptable to those who draft and approve amendments to the Rules.” 
Id. The Advisory Committee, consistent with Professor Sonenshein’s prediction, is not con-
sidering any proposal that would completely bar bad-acts evidence when offered to prove 
intent. 
 154. An “active contest” requirement has usually been applied to evidence offered to 
prove a mental state, but logically it can be applied to other purposes such as identity and 
motive. See United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting the defendant 
was not contesting knowledge of the drugs when considering whether to admit the defen-
dant’s prior drug convictions). 
 155. 763 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“One important issue in Rule 403 
balancing in this context is the extent to which the non-propensity factual proposition ac-
tually is contested in the case.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92 (1997) (holding that 
defense stipulation to felon status rendered evidence of defendant’s prior felony convic-
tion inadmissible because the “risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the dis-
counted probative value of the record of conviction”)); see also Imwinkelried et al., 
796 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:769 
distribution offenses, the court noted that it has “adopted a rule that 
other-act evidence is not admissible to show intent unless the defendant 
puts intent ‘at issue’ beyond a general denial of guilt” because the fact-
ﬁnder may readily infer the defendant’s intent from the act itself.159 The 
court explained that “intent is automatically at issue” in cases involving 
speciﬁc intent crimes and that active contest by the defendant is not 
necessarily required for admission of other-acts evidence to demonstrate 
intent in those circumstances.160 The court cautioned, however, that 
other-acts evidence is not automatically admissible in speciﬁc intent cases 
because the evidence must always be relevant to intent in a permissible 
way.161 
Similarly, the Third Circuit requires that the defendant actively con-
test his mental state before the prosecution may seek to admit bad-acts 
evidence to show “knowledge” or “intent.”162 In Caldwell, the government 
alleged that the defendant, a convicted felon, had actual possession of a 
gun, which the defendant ﬂatly denied.163 Because the defendant did not 
dispute the mental element of the offense, but rather denied the con-
duct entirely, the court held that “knowledge . . . was not a proper basis 
for admitting evidence of Caldwell’s prior [weapons] convictions.”164 The 
“active contest” requirement formed part of the court’s Rule 404(b) 
analysis, as follows: 
Finally, we believe it necessary to address the District 
Court’s suggestion that Caldwell “put his knowledge at issue by 
claiming innocence.” It is unclear whether the District Court 
understood Caldwell to have “claimed innocence” by testifying 
at trial, or more broadly by pleading not guilty. Either way, we 
believe this line of reasoning is improper.  
Situations may indeed arise where the content of a 
defendant’s trial testimony transforms a previously irrelevant 
404(b) purpose into a material issue in a case. For example, if 
                                                                                                                           
Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 908 n.77 (“[Old Chief] strengthens the 
argument that if the defense tenders a full, unconditional stipulation to a fact in issue, the 
tender greatly reduces the prosecution need to resort to uncharged misconduct evidence 
to establish the fact.” (citation omitted)). 
 159. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (citing United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (7th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Conner, 583 
F.3d 1011, 1022 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 161. See id.; see also United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 537 (7th Cir. 2014) (“By 
putting on evidence regarding who possessed the drugs in the house and disputing 
motive, Schmitt ‘opened the door’ to evidence that he was convicted of possessing the 
marijuana.”); Miller, 673 F.3d at 697–98 (“[E]vidence tending to prove intent becomes 
more probative, when the defense actually works to deny intent, joining the issue by 
contesting it . . . . [I]f merely denying guilt opens the door wide to prior convictions for 
the same crime, nothing is left of the Rule 404(b) prohibition.”). 
 162. United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 283 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 163. Id. at 272, 278–79. 
 164. Id. at 279, 281. 
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Caldwell had testiﬁed that he thought the object in his hand was 
something other than a gun, then it would immediately become 
critical for the prosecution to rebut his claim of mistake and to 
show his knowledge of the true nature of the thing possessed. 
We disagree, however, with the proposition that, merely by de-
nying guilt of an offense with a knowledge-based mens rea, a 
defendant opens the door to admissibility of prior convictions 
of the same crime. . . . Accordingly, we reject the suggestion that 
“claiming innocence” is sufficient to place knowledge at issue 
for purposes of Rule 404(b).165 
But many courts ﬁnd that a defendant puts knowledge at issue sim-
ply by entering a plea of not guilty because the government is then 
required to prove mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of 
whether the defendant actively contests that element at trial.166 Thus, 
there is a circuit split on the use of prior bad acts to prove the defen-
dant’s mental state when the defendant does not actively contest mental 
state at trial. The more traditional approach to uncharged misconduct 
permits the government to admit other-acts evidence to carry its high 
burden of proof notwithstanding the lack of an actual trial dispute over 
                                                                                                                           
 165. Id. at 281. For additional examples, see United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 265 
(4th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that the defendant did not contest his knowledge of mar-
ijuana or his intent to distribute it if he possessed it, but only contested his dominion and 
control over the contraband); United States v. Ford, 839 F.3d 94, 109 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(expressing concern about the trial court’s admission of evidence concerning defendant’s 
prior acts because the defendant’s decision not to contest intent “signiﬁcantly reduced” 
the probative value of the testimony (citing United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 
121–24 (1st Cir. 2000))); United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding evidence of uncharged drug activity was not admissible to prove intent because 
the defendant “unequivocally” relied on a defense that he did not do the act at all 
(quoting United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1988))). But see United States 
v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that uncharged acts of solicitation 
were admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) because the defendant put his mental state at 
issue by “contending that he did not accept items from JRA contractors with the intention 
of inﬂuencing the awarding of JRA contracts”). 
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding, in a 
prosecution for cocaine trafficking, that a prior drug distribution conviction was properly 
admitted despite defendant’s general-denial defense); United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 
1211, 1225 (11th Cir. 2013) (“There is ‘[a]mple precedent . . . in this circuit ﬁnding that a 
not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case . . . makes intent a material issue and opens the 
door to admission of prior drug-related offenses as highly probative . . . evidence of a 
defendant’s intent.’” (quoting United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1332 (11th Cir. 
1997))); United States v. Olguin, 643 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant’s not-
guilty plea intuitively puts his intent and knowledge into issue.”); United States v. Hardy, 
643 F.3d 143, 151 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that prosecutors may use Rule 404(b) evidence 
to prove speciﬁc intent regardless of the defendant’s defense in cases in which the crime 
charged requires speciﬁc intent); United States v. Douglas, 482 F.3d 591, 597 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (stating that the prosecution is entitled to present Rule 404(b) evidence to establish 
the elements of intent and knowledge despite defendant’s offer to stipulate because the 
prosecution has to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt); United 
States v. Jones, 982 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1992) (same). 
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the element at issue, whereas more recent Rule 404(b) holdings reveal a 
deﬁnite trend toward an “active contest” requirement. 
D.  A Requiem for the “Inextricably Intertwined” Doctrine 
Rule 404(b)(1) provides that “crimes, wrongs, or other acts” cannot 
be offered as proof of character to prove conduct on a particular occa-
sion.167 Therefore, the Rule 404(b) prohibition applies only to “other” 
crimes, wrongs, or acts and not to acts that are part of the charged 
offense. However, courts have struggled to determine which acts are 
“other acts” under the purview of Rule 404(b) as opposed to acts that are 
part of the offense charged. Most courts ask whether the bad-acts evi-
dence the prosecution seeks to admit is “inextricably intertwined” with 
the crime charged.168 In cases in which the bad-acts evidence is 
“inextricably intertwined” with the acts constituting the crime charged, 
Rule 404(b) is considered inapplicable. Thus, the government need not 
articulate a “not-for-character” purpose when seeking to admit the evi-
dence, and need not provide prior notice of the intent to use the 
evidence.169 
As examined above, federal courts have frequently applied the “in-
extricably intertwined” doctrine loosely with shallow analysis of the 
connection between the proffered acts and the charged offense.170 
Another recent trend in Rule 404(b) decisions reveals that some courts 
are limiting the scope of the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine. These 
federal opinions are demanding a much closer connection between prof-
fered acts and a charged offense before exempting such acts from Rule 
404(b) scrutiny. 
Several circuits have gone so far as to question whether acts that are 
inextricably intertwined with the charged offense should be exempt from 
Rule 404(b) scrutiny. In United States v. Green, for example, the govern-
ment sought to introduce evidence that the defendant, who was charged 
with drug offenses, threatened to kill the person who turned him over to 
authorities.171 The government argued that the evidence was “intrinsic 
evidence” relevant to the charged drug offenses.172 Without conducting a 
Rule 404(b) analysis, the trial judge granted the government’s motion to 
                                                                                                                           
 167. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
 168. See, e.g., United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir. 1993) (“When 
deciding if the ‘other acts’ evidence was admissible without reference to Rule 404(b), we 
must determine whether such evidence was ‘intricately related to the facts of the case’ at 
hand.” (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 929 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1991))). 
 169. Of course, Rule 403 will still apply to the evidence. See id. (“If we ﬁnd the 
evidence is so related, the only limitation on the admission of such evidence is the balanc-
ing test required by Rule 403.”). 
 170. See supra notes 63–93 and accompanying text. 
 171. 617 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 172. Id.  
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admit the evidence.173 Although the Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the 
trial judge’s ruling, the court rejected the “inextricably intertwined” 
doctrine as “vague, overbroad, and prone to abuse.”174 The court’s de-
tailed opinion describes three problems with the “inextricably inter-
twined” test. First, the test “creates confusion” because “no one knows 
what it means.”175 The confusion, the court notes, has resulted in different 
and non-interchangeable formulations of the test, and the question of 
“[w]hether evidence qualiﬁes as intrinsic in a particular case may well 
depend on which version of the test one employs.”176 The court reasoned 
that “Green’s threat to kill [the person who turned him over to 
authorities] would qualify as intrinsic if the test is whether it ‘pertain[s] 
to the chain of events explaining the context’ of the crime,” but that it 
would not qualify as inextricably intertwined “if the test were whether that 
threat was ‘an integral part of the immediate context of the crime 
charged.’”177 According to the Green court, another failing of the 
“inextricably intertwined test” is that it is “unnecessary.”178 The court 
noted that a common justiﬁcation for the admission of “intertwined acts 
is to allow a witness to testify freely and coherently” without “tiptoe[ing] 
around uncharged bad acts by the defendant,” a goal that can be met 
“without circumventing Rule 404(b).”179 This is necessarily so because 
“allowing the jury to understand the circumstances surrounding the 
charged crime—completing the story—is a proper, non-propensity 
purpose under Rule 404(b).”180 The third and ﬁnal ﬂaw in the 
“inextricably intertwined” doctrine, according to the court, is its suscep-
tibility to being applied in a broad and conclusory fashion that allows 
“virtually any bad act” to be classiﬁed as “intrinsic.”181 Thus, the Green 
court explicitly held that the “inextricably intertwined” standard would 
no longer serve as the test for intrinsic evidence: “Like its predecessor res 
gestae, the inextricably intertwined test is vague, overbroad, and prone to 
abuse, and we cannot ignore the danger it poses to the vitality of Rule 
404(b).”182 
Of course, line drawing is unavoidable in connection with Rule 
404(b) because it applies only to “other” acts. Therefore, the Green court 
did not entirely “reject the concept of intrinsic evidence” and outlined 
“two narrow categories of evidence” it would consider “intrinsic” to the 
                                                                                                                           
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 248. 
 175. Id. at 246. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (ﬁrst quoting United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004); 
then quoting United States v. Hall, 604 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 178. Id. at 247. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 248. 
 182. Id. 
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charged offense and exempt from Rule 404(b) analysis.183 The court 
found that acts that “directly prove” the charged offense could not be 
considered “other acts” subject to a Rule 404(b) analysis. In addition, the 
court found that “uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with 
the charged crime may be termed intrinsic if they facilitate the com-
mission of the charged crime.”184 According to the Third Circuit, any 
proffered acts not within these two narrow categories must be analyzed 
pursuant to Rule 404(b). 
Under this narrow formulation of “intrinsic” evidence, the court 
held that the defendant’s threat to kill the witness was not intrinsic and 
thus fell under Rule 404(b).185 The court reasoned that the proffered 
evidence was not intrinsic because it did not directly prove that the de-
fendant attempted to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute.186 
Additionally, the proffered evidence “did not in any meaningful way 
facilitate his attempt to procure cocaine . . . the only crime with which 
[the defendant] was charged.”187 Ultimately, the court affirmed the 
admission of the evidence under a Rule 404(b) analysis, consistent with 
its position that the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine is unnecessary. 
The court found that the threat evidence was properly admitted under 
Rule 404(b) to provide important context to the jury and to explain the 
motives of a government witness that the defendant challenged at trial.188 
Similarly, in United States v. Gorman, the Seventh Circuit discarded 
the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine.189 In Gorman, the defendant was 
charged with perjury after he lied to a grand jury by testifying that he did 
not store a car in a parking garage.190 At trial, the government offered ev-
idence that the defendant took two bags of money from the car, moved 
the car from its original location, and later abandoned the car.191 The 
trial court admitted this evidence as “inextricably intertwined” with the 
perjury charge, and the defendant was convicted.192 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction but explicitly held that 
“[h]enceforth, resort to inextricable intertwinement is unavailable when 
determining a theory of admissibility.”193 The court acknowledged that 
“[t]here traditionally have been subtle distinctions between direct evi-
dence of a charged crime, inextricable intertwinement evidence, and 
                                                                                                                           
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 
232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 250. 
 189. 613 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 190. Id. at 715. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 719. 
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Rule 404(b) evidence,” but found that courts have frequently “lumped 
together these kinds of evidence” and have clouded “the already murky 
waters of the inextricable intertwinement doctrine.”194 Consequently, the 
court held that “the inextricable intertwinement doctrine has since be-
come overused, vague and quite unhelpful” and pronounced that the 
doctrine “has outlived its usefulness.”195 
In examining the evidence of the defendant’s conduct with respect 
to the car in the garage, the court found it admissible without the need 
to invoke the intertwinement doctrine: 
Because the basis for the perjury charge was that [the defen-
dant] denied “having” the car in his garage, his theft of the car 
and extrication of the money from within were direct evidence 
of his false testimony. The fact that [the defendant] removed 
the Bentley from the garage demonstrated that he “had” a 
Bentley in the garage in the ﬁrst instance. Therefore, this 
evidence was properly admitted, albeit as direct evidence rather 
than inextricable intertwinement evidence.196 
Similarly, in United States v. Bowie, the D.C. Circuit refused to apply 
the “inextricably intertwined” test to determine the admissibility of evi-
dence offered to “complete the story” or “explain the circumstances” of 
the charged crime.197 In rejecting the test, the court reasoned that acts 
truly “intrinsic” to the charged crime “will, by deﬁnition, always satisfy 
Rule 404(b).”198 Thus, the only real impact of branding other-acts evi-
dence “inextricably intertwined” is “to relieve the prosecution of Rule 
404(b)’s notice requirement and the court of its obligation to give an 
appropriate limiting instruction upon defense counsel’s request.”199 The 
Bowie court concluded that “there is no general ‘complete the story’ or 
‘explain the circumstances’ exception to Rule 404(b)” and that “Rule 
404(b), and particularly its notice requirement, should not be disre-
garded on such a ﬂimsy basis.”200 
Notwithstanding this trend to eliminate or restrict resort to the 
“inextricably intertwined” doctrine, other circuits continue to employ 
                                                                                                                           
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. For another example of this reasoning, see United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 
524, 533 (7th Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding the “district court’s conclusion that the drug evidence 
was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the charged act and ‘ﬁll[ed] the story’” ran counter to 
recent precedent and was “not dispositive on the issue of relevance or the ultimate 
admissibility of the drug evidence”). For further discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s 
position on the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine, see Jaime L. Padgett, How Less Is 
More: The Unraveling of the Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine Under United States v. 
Gorman, 6 Seventh Cir. Rev. 196, 229 (2010) (applauding the court for abandoning the 
“inextricably intertwined” doctrine). 
 197. 232 F.3d 923, 928–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 198. Id. at 927. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 929. 
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the doctrine broadly to ﬁnd that Rule 404(b) is inapplicable. In these 
circuits, “evidence used to ‘complete the story’ is pretty much the same 
as evidence admitted for ‘context’ under Rule 404(b).”201 Indeed, 
evidence found “intrinsic” in these circuits could often be characterized 
as evidence of state of mind or consciousness of guilt, which fall under 
the purview of Rule 404(b).202 Therefore, there remains a split of author-
ity regarding proper application of Rule 404(b) and the role that the 
doctrine of “intrinsic” or “inextricably intertwined” acts plays in the Rule 
404(b) analysis. 
IV. AMENDING FEDERAL RULE 404(B): THE POSSIBILITIES 
The growing divide between circuits that have curtailed the admissi-
bility of other-acts evidence in criminal cases and those that have 
routinely admitted evidence of a criminal defendant’s past crimes signals 
that the time is ripe for an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b).203 The concerns and limitations, outlined most prominently in 
the Seventh and Third Circuit cases described above, provide several 
possibilities for amendment.204 Consequently, the Advisory Committee is 
currently considering a number of proposals to amend Rule 404(b).205 
This Part discusses the drafting alternatives being considered by the 
Committee. 
A.  A Propensity Inference Ban 
One possibility for amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) 
would be to add language expressly prohibiting the use of any other 
                                                                                                                           
 201. Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 326 (describing 
the split of authorities). 
 202. Id. For examples of cases using this reasoning, see, e.g., United States v. Loftis, 
843 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016) (ﬁnding uncharged fraudulent transactions are 
intrinsic to the charged scheme); United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 
2015) (ﬁnding evidence that defendant supported al Shabaab before it was designated a 
terrorist organization “intrinsic” to a conspiracy charge because it “provid[ed] context to 
the charged crime”); United States v. Castleman, 795 F.3d 904, 915 (8th Cir. 2015) (ﬁnd-
ing that death threats against witnesses, offered to prove consciousness of guilt in a drug 
prosecution, constituted “‘direct evidence of the crime charged’ and [were] not subject to 
a Rule 404(b) analysis” (quoting United States v. Zierke, 618 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 
2010))); United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1394 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of 
uncharged conduct that is part of the same scheme or series of transactions and uses the 
same modus operandi as the charged offenses is admissible as intrinsic evidence outside 
the scope of Rule 404(b).”); see also Imwinkelried, The Second Coming, supra note 65, at 
726 (noting that when courts have invoked the inextricably intertwined doctrine, they 
could “just as easily” have used a “noncharacter theory” under Rule 404(b)). 
 203. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2012) (authorizing changes to the rules “as may be 
necessary to maintain consistency”). 
 204. See supra notes 101–109, 116–131, 140–152, 155–165, 171–196 and 
accompanying text (summarizing the Third and Seventh Circuit’s decisions). 
 205. Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 17–20. 
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crime, wrong, or act if its probative value depends at all upon a pro-
pensity inference that suggests that a defendant is guilty of a charged 
crime because “she did it before.” A strict propensity ban would 
eliminate any interpretation of Rule 404(b) as a rule of “inclusion.”206 
Such an amendment would echo the recent opinions of the Third, 
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits and would go hand in hand with a require-
ment that the proponent of Rule 404(b) evidence and the district court 
articulate with “careful precision” the chain of reasoning that demon-
strates the probative value of the other act to ensure that it does not rely 
upon a propensity inference.207 An amendment that expressly bans use of 
a crime, wrong, or act that depends upon a propensity inference could 
also assist litigants and judges in policing such a requirement by beeﬁng 
up the notice provisions of Rule 404(b).208 Adding both a propensity ban 
and enhanced notice requirements will assure timely notice of 
nonpropensity arguments, and will also provide speciﬁc authority for the 
court to exclude the bad-acts evidence if the probative value for the 
asserted purpose actually proceeds through a propensity inference. 
This amendment to Rule 404(b) could add the emphasized 
language below and read: 
(b) CRIMES, WRONGS, OR OTHER ACTS. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
                                                                                                                           
 206. A Committee Note might also address the problem, but that would depend on 
what textual amendments are proposed. A Note must be attendant to some change to the 
text. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d). Moreover, the Rule Committees follow a practice that a 
Committee Note cannot establish rules that are not found in the text. See Spring 2017 
Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 315–16 (“The problem is such a 
profound one (with such a substantial impact on litigation) that if it is going to be 
addressed, it should probably be addressed in text, with an explanatory note in support.”). 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 208. Requiring that proponents of other-acts evidence articulate a nonpropensity 
chain of reasoning in their Rule 404(b) notice without adding an express prohibition on 
propensity in the substantive standard is another alternative. Changing the notice 
provision alone, however, would be less effective than an amendment that alters both the 
substantive standard of admissibility and the notice provision. A violation of a substantive 
provision renders evidence inadmissible. See, e.g., United States v. Hitesman, No. 14-CR-
00010-LHK-1, 2016 WL 3523854, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2016) (excluding evidence of 
the defendant’s prior bank robbery convictions because they were insufficiently distinctive 
to show identity as required by Rule 404(b)(2)). A violation of the notice provision, how-
ever, means only that the proponent failed to timely articulate a nonpropensity purpose, 
and it will be in the discretion of the court whether to exclude the evidence. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b)(2)(B) (requiring only “reasonable notice” and permitting trial courts to 
“excuse” lack of pretrial notice altogether for good cause); see also United States v. Perez-
Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1560–63 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming the trial court’s decision to admit 
Rule 404(b) evidence notwithstanding the government’s failure to give notice until just 
before voir dire and concluding that the defendant could not show prejudice from fail-
ure). In other words, a notice provision does not itself guarantee that the bad-acts 
evidence will have to proceed through nonpropensity inferences; rather, the notice pro-
vision would only guarantee timely articulation of the proponent’s nonpropensity purpose. 
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order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for 
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 
of mistake, or lack of accident. But the probative value for 
the other purpose may not depend on a propensity inference.209 
(3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case, the 
prosecutor must:210 
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature 
of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to 
offer at trial; 
(B) articulate in the notice the nonpropensity purpose for 
which the prosecution intends to offer the evidence; 
(C) articulate the chain of reasoning supporting the 
purpose for offering the evidence; and 
(D) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, 
for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.211 
Such an amendment, which combines an express propensity ban 
with enhanced notice provisions, could include an Advisory Committee 
Note explaining the meaning and impact of the changes, as follows:  
                                                                                                                           
 209. The notice provision in current Rule 404(b) appears in subsection (2) as part of 
the substantive admissibility limitations. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). If the propensity prohi-
bition is added as above, it would make sense to drop Rule 404(b)’s notice provision to a 
new and separate subsection (3) independent of the substantive provisions governing ad-
missibility. A separate notice subsection would be consistent with the structure of Federal 
Rule of Evidence Rule 412, which includes subsection (c) governing the “Procedure to 
Determine Admissibility” separate from the previous subsections dictating substantive ad-
missibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 412(c). 
 210. Because the requirement that the defendant “request” notice is complied with on 
a pro forma basis, it adds nothing but a trap for the unwary to the operation of the notice 
provision. For this reason, the Advisory Committee has already approved in principle a 
proposed amendment to the Rule 404(b) notice provision that eliminates the requirement 
of a defense “request” for notice. See Fall 2016 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra 
note 15, at 31. 
 211. This proposal places the good cause exception last to make clear that it applies to 
all of the prosecution’s notice and articulation obligations. One problem with requiring 
detailed articulation of nonpropensity purposes within the criminal notice provision is 
that this would deprive judges and litigants in civil cases of such detailed information in 
advance of trial to assist them in ascertaining nonpropensity purposes for other-acts evi-
dence. Although the problems in the admission of other-acts evidence have largely arisen 
on the criminal side, this evidence can present difficulties in the civil context as well. See 
Lisa Marshall, Note, The Character of Discrimination Law: The Incompatibility of Rule 
404 and Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 Yale L.J. 1063, 1076 (2005) (“[W]hen 
plaintiffs purport to offer evidence of an employer’s ‘motive,’ they overwhelmingly do so 
[because] . . . [t]he employer’s prior acts reveal that the employer has some discriminatory 
mindset . . . .”). To obtain the maximum beneﬁt from expanded notice and articulation 
requirements, therefore, the Advisory Committee could consider extending the notice 
provision to civil cases. 
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The amendment emphasizes that it is not enough simply to 
articulate a noncharacter purpose for evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. In order for Rule 404(b) to protect in accor-
dance with its intent, the probative value of the evidence for the 
proper purpose cannot be dependent on a propensity infer-
ence. For example, if evidence of uncharged misconduct is 
offered to prove intent, it cannot be admitted for that purpose 
if the inference is, “because the bad act shows the accused has a 
propensity to commit a crime like the one charged, it tends to 
prove the accused had the intent to commit the charged 
crime.” The proponent must therefore articulate to the court 
the chain of inferences from the bad-acts evidence to the 
purpose for which it is offered and explain how that chain of 
inferences does not depend on the actor’s propensity. 
An absolute ban on propensity could present some signiﬁcant prob-
lems, however. First, one might argue that “adding” a ban on the pro-
pensity inference to Rule 404(b)(2) merely reiterates the prohibition 
already stated in Rule 404(b)(1) that provides: “Evidence of a crime, 
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accor-
dance with the character.”212 An amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence that provides, in essence, “We really mean it—please follow the 
rule,” is certainly not in keeping with effective rulemaking. Further, such 
a potentially redundant admonition may do little to curb the abuses of 
Rule 404(b) by the federal circuits already inclined to admit other-acts 
evidence permissively. 
Even if one might interpret the existing language of Rule 404(b)(1) 
as creating a de facto propensity prohibition, the fact remains that Rule 
404 nowhere uses the term “propensity.” Instead, the Rule speaks in 
terms of proving that a “person acted in accordance” with character.213 
Amending Rule 404(b) to introduce a ban on “a propensity inference” 
would require courts to deﬁne this new terminology and to engage in the 
difficult task of determining with precision which uses of other-acts evi-
dence involve a propensity inference—especially when the proper pur-
pose is intent. As Judge Tjoﬂat emphasized in his special concurrence in 
United States v. Matthews, “[T]he line between evidence admitted to de-
monstrate intent and evidence admitted to demonstrate propensity is 
hardly clear.”214 Introducing new terminology into the Rule is certain to 
invite costly litigation aimed at interpreting it. 
Assuming that an amendment that adds a propensity ban to Rule 
404(b)(2) would alter the existing meaning of Rule 404(b), it could also 
alter existing, well-accepted uses of other-acts evidence. To be sure, the 
                                                                                                                           
 212. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
 213. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 214. 431 F.3d 1296, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoﬂat, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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use of other-acts evidence to prove a defendant’s knowledge and intent 
poses the greatest propensity risk.215 But even commonly accepted “pro-
per purposes” for other-acts evidence could be seen as involving some 
degree of propensity reasoning. Take classic modus operandi evidence as 
an example. Imagine a bank robber with a distinctive signature—perhaps 
the robber wears a ball cap with Mickey Mouse emblazoned on the front 
and leaves tellers with typewritten thank-you notes in Chaucerian English 
on heavy cardstock stationery. If a defendant were charged with robbing 
a bank in this way, her strikingly similar method of operation in a 
previous bank robbery would have a strong tendency to suggest the de-
fendant’s identity in connection with the charged offense. When a 
defendant contests her identity, at least, all courts would agree that 
other-acts evidence that rises to the level of a signature should be 
admissible to prove identity pursuant to Rule 404(b)(2).216 To be sure, 
such modus operandi evidence relies on an assumption about how 
objectively unlikely it would be for a different person to light upon this 
same distinctive method of operation to rob a bank.217 But this type of 
“signature” evidence surely relies to some extent upon a degree of pro-
pensity reasoning. If the defendant did the crime in this unique way 
before, the defendant is the one who probably did it in the same unique 
way again because of her unusual tendency to operate in this manner. To 
effectuate a true ban on propensity, courts will be forced to deﬁne 
“propensity,” to ferret out any reliance on a propensity inference, and to 
reject other-acts evidence the probative value of which relies to any 
degree on such an inference. 
Further, while the “intent” purpose for other-acts evidence has been 
one of the most abused “proper purposes” under existing precedent, a 
wholesale ban on propensity inferences would risk eliminating “intent” 
as a proper purpose for other-acts evidence altogether, even in cases in 
which it would be appropriate. In cases like the pair of Smith cases dis-
cussed above, courts have misused the intent purpose for other-acts 
evidence, allowing a defendant’s past drug offenses to prove “intent” to 
commit a current offense even when the defendant does not dispute 
knowledge of drugs or intent to possess or sell them, but simply denies 
commission of the charged offense.218 In such cases, a defendant is essen-
tially saying, “I didn’t engage in this conduct at all.” In cases like these, 
the only probative value of prior drug offenses is to show that a 
                                                                                                                           
 215. See supra section III.B (discussing several federal cases illustrating the difficulties 
of separating the permissible purposes of knowledge and intent from impermissible pro-
pensity inferences). 
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 696 F.2d 753, 755 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting 
that “[i]f the crimes share elements that possess ‘signature quality,’ evidence of the ‘other 
crime’ may be admitted” when identity is in dispute). 
 217. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 907 (discuss-
ing the doctrine of objective chances). 
 218. See supra notes 47–62 and accompanying text. 
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defendant is more likely to “commit” an offense involving drugs because 
the defendant has done so in the past. This is pure propensity and 
should be prohibited as violating the ban on character evidence. Adding 
an express prohibition on any chain of reasoning that relies on pro-
pensity to Rule 404(b) could curb abuses such as these. 
It may be appropriate, however, to permit use of other-acts evidence 
to prove intent in cases in which it is probative and necessary to refute a 
speciﬁc defense raised by a criminal defendant—even though that use 
involves some reliance on a propensity inference. For example, take a de-
fendant charged with willful tax evasion due to failure to report cash 
earnings as taxable income. Such a defendant might concede earning 
the money, as well as the failure to report it to the IRS, and yet deny the 
necessary intent to evade taxes.219 The defendant could argue that the 
failure to include the particular earnings stemmed from oversight and 
forgetfulness but not from an intent to avoid legal tax obligations or to 
defraud the IRS. To rebut this defense, evidence that the same defendant 
had earned signiﬁcant cash income during one previous uncharged time 
period (in an amount impossible to “forget”) and failed to report it for 
that time period would be highly probative of the absence of any “mis-
take” or “accident” and of the defendant’s “intent” to evade tax obliga-
tions. The fact that the defendant had willfully failed to report earnings 
before could powerfully refute the defendant’s speciﬁc defense of 
accident raised in the instant case. 
Because proof of state of mind is elusive and because obtaining alter-
native evidence to combat the defendant’s purported reasons for the 
current failure to report would be difficult, the probative value of such 
prior conduct for the government would be high and would surely 
eclipse the risk that the jury would use the prior act simply to assume, 
“Once a tax evader, always a tax evader,” or to punish the defendant for 
past misdeeds. Thus, when a defendant like this one actively contests 
state of mind or intent, prior intentional acts may be extremely 
important to the government’s ability to respond. And yet, a complete 
ban on any purpose for which a propensity inference is required could 
eliminate the prosecution’s ability to use this defendant’s prior act be-
cause it would be arguing that the previous failure to report taxes 
knowingly and intentionally makes it more likely that the current failure 
to report was also knowing and intentional. The defendant willfully did it 
before, making it more likely that this time, it was also willful. The spec-
ter of “propensity” rears its head. 
One could attempt to argue that the doctrine of “objective chan-
ces”220 supports the inference of intent in such a circumstance, rather 
                                                                                                                           
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting 
that voluntary, intentional violation is an element of tax evasion). 
 220. See Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 907 
(explaining the doctrine of objective chances, which supports an inference of guilty know-
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than propensity. If the defendant did it on purpose previously, what are 
the chances that this time was inadvertent? If the government could 
prove many prior intentional acts, such “objective chances” might be said 
to support the showing of intent without regard to any propensity 
inference. But when the government can point to only a single prior in-
stance, as in this hypothetical and in many actual cases, it is very hard to 
see how one might draw an inference of intent in the absence of any 
inference about the defendant’s tendencies with respect to tax evasion. 
Similar legitimate uses of other acts to show “intent” could come up in 
classic federal drug prosecutions as well, such as when a defendant 
concedes the possession of a distribution quantity of drugs but argues 
speciﬁcally that she had no intent to distribute and planned to maintain 
the large quantity for personal use. Previous distribution convictions or 
convictions for possession with intent to distribute would be important to 
the government’s ability to refute this testimony but would certainly de-
pend upon some propensity inferences. 
This use of other-acts evidence is emblematic of the traditional 
“door-opening” or “turnabout is fair play” operation of the evidence 
rules.221 And yet, the use of prior acts of drug distribution or nonre-
porting of income in either of these cases would suggest intent and 
knowledge, at least in part, by way of a propensity inference.222 Placing an 
absolute prohibition on a propensity inference, as the Seventh and Third 
Circuits have done, may swing the pendulum too far in the direction of 
exclusion and prevent government use of other-acts evidence even in 
compelling circumstances that would be in keeping with the original 
intent behind Rule 404(b). Indeed, an express propensity ban may write 
“intent” off the list of proper purposes under Rule 404(b)(2).223 
Finally, enforcing a complete ban on the propensity inference also 
requires “careful precision” and exact articulation of the reasoning sup-
porting the use of other-acts evidence by the trial judge, as noted in the 
                                                                                                                           
ledge and intent based on the “improbability of coincidence” and the objective unlikeli-
hood that an innocent person will repeatedly ﬁnd herself in suspicious circumstances). 
 221. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988) (“The Advisory 
Committee speciﬁcally declined to offer any ‘mechanical solution’ to the admission of 
evidence under 404(b). Rather, the Committee indicated that the trial court should assess 
such evidence under the usual rules for admissibility . . . .” (citation omitted)); James P. 
Gillespie, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 106: A Proposal to Return to the Common Law 
Doctrine of Completeness, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 382, 390 & n.78 (1987) (citing Rule 
404(a)(1) as performing a “door opening” function). 
 222. See Milich, supra note 9, at 786 (“[T]he distinction between legitimate 
‘propensity free’ inferences from character evidence and disfavored propensity uses is far 
from clear and is difficult to apply. Many of Rule 404(b)’s admissible uses of character evi-
dence are more or less dependent on propensity inferences.”); Morris, supra note 10, at 
191 (“The earlier drug use, which is behavioral evidence, can be relevant only if we as-
sume that the defendant’s behavior forms an unchanging pattern.”). 
 223. See Sonenshein, supra note 10, at 275 (“Rule 404(b) should be amended to 
exclude intent from its list of permissible offers.”). 
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recent Repak case out of the Third Circuit.224 Although the trial judge in 
that case provided paragraphs of analysis supporting the admission of 
other-acts evidence by the government, the Third Circuit found that the 
district court’s ﬁndings fell short.225 Like a law professor critiquing a stu-
dent’s paper, the Third Circuit chastised the district court for omitting 
the magic words establishing precisely how the other-acts evidence dem-
onstrated intent without reliance on propensity.226 Although detailed 
record ﬁndings supporting the admissibility of other-acts evidence are ap-
propriate, helpful, and should be encouraged, to reject the extensive 
analysis performed by the trial judge in Repak places an impossible 
burden on even the most careful trial judge to ﬁnd just the right words to 
eliminate the slippery specter of propensity.227 
An amendment to Rule 404(b) that holds trial judges to such 
exacting standards could prove inefficient and unrealistic, even when 
decisions are made in advance of trial, but particularly when other-acts 
objections are raised during the heat of a criminal trial. Such mandatory 
detail and precision would hamstring trial judges and slow down 
proceedings. In addition, such a requirement would place new burdens 
on prosecutors to identify and articulate the precise reasoning support-
ing the use of any other-acts evidence to include in their pretrial notices. 
Indeed, as set forth above, an amended notice provision would be a likely 
and necessary companion to an amendment that ﬂatly prohibits pro-
pensity reasoning.228 Although the notice provision would excuse a lack 
of such precise articulation for “good cause,” prosecutors may risk losing 
other-acts evidence due to a failure to predict precisely in advance of trial 
the reasoning supporting a proffer of other-acts evidence. 
In sum, while a propensity ban could potentially serve to curb some 
of the worst abuses in Rule 404(b) cases, it is rife with thorny problems 
that could thwart its operation. 
B.  Requiring “Active Contest” 
To address the many federal decisions in which courts ﬁnd that de-
fendants open the door to other-acts evidence simply by pleading not 
guilty—and to assure that the prosecution would not be allowed to admit 
bad acts to show a proper purpose that the defendant does not even con-
test—Rule 404(b)(2) could be amended to require “active contest” by 
                                                                                                                           
 224. United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
 225. Id. (“In essence, this was the ‘mere recitation of the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2)’ 
that we have previously deemed inadequate.” (quoting Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277)). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 4:29 (“There may even be a risk that 
a hard rule demanding that judges jump through hoops every time such evidence is of-
fered would lead to recitations of stock phrases that do little to assure the exercise of 
care.”). 
 228. See supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text. 
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the opponent of his “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”229 Such an 
amendment would be in keeping with recent precedent in the Seventh 
and Third Circuits discussed above.230 
This amendment would appear within Rule 404(b)(2) and could 
read: 
(b) CRIMES, WRONGS, OR OTHER ACTS. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This 
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such 
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident—where that purpose has been actively contested by 
the opponent.231 
There would be undeniable beneﬁts to an approach that required 
“active contest” before permitting other-acts evidence. First, the cases 
holding that a criminal defendant “opens the door” to evidence of his 
prior misdeeds simply by pleading “not guilty” would effectively be over-
ruled by such an amendment.232 In the classic possession with intent to 
distribute prosecution, for example, even the most permissive jurists 
would be hard-pressed to ﬁnd that a defendant actively contested “in-
tent” merely by denying the commission of the offense and going to trial. 
And of course, a committee note could shore matters up by stating that 
the textual change is indeed intended to overrule this precedent. 
Additionally, such an amendment would continue to allow other acts 
to be proved in cases like the hypothetical tax evasion or possession with 
intent to distribute prosecutions described above. By claiming accidental 
failure to report income, or an intent to keep a large quantity of drugs 
for purely personal use, a criminal defendant would actively contest in-
tent and open the door to probative other-acts evidence proffered by the 
                                                                                                                           
 229. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
 230. See supra section III.C. 
 231. Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 335. This version 
of Rule 404(b) emphasizes language that could be added to create an “active contest” 
requirement. An amendment mandating “active contest” by the opponent of Rule 404(b) 
evidence could be combined with an amendment expressly banning a propensity chain of 
reasoning or could be added independently. Instead of amending the text of Rule 
404(b)(2) to require “active contest” by the opponent, the Advisory Committee alter-
natively could address the importance of “active contest” in a committee note accompa-
nying other amendments to the Rule, such as the propensity ban. This option, however, 
risks the note doing much more than the text. Moreover, the note would be guidance but 
not controlling. 
 232. See supra note 166 (discussing cases in which the court admitted evidence of 
prior bad acts given defendants’ not guilty plea). 
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prosecution. Indeed, an amendment that adds an “active contest” 
requirement to Rule 404(b) could prove more effective and offer a bet-
ter calibration in the admission of other-acts evidence than an amend-
ment that bans propensity inferences altogether.233 
That said, an “active contest” requirement would present signiﬁcant 
concerns in application that could prove even more insurmountable 
than the obstacles facing courts and litigants in policing a propensity 
ban. First and foremost, such an amendment would require parties to 
deﬁne and trial courts to interpret the contours of the term “active con-
test.” Because determining whether a defendant has actively contested a 
particular point may be murky at best, courts and litigants may be forced 
to expend significant resources pursuing this elusive standard. Notwith-
standing predictable battles over an “active contest” requirement, it is 
nearly impossible to articulate lines that can be drawn consistently. 
Courts would have to adopt a case-by-case approach to address the 
questions sure to arise about various degrees of “active contest.” For ex-
ample, courts would have to determine to what extent arguing that the 
government has not proven every element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt constitutes “active contest” of all elements of the 
offense. If a government witness testiﬁes in a way that tends to prove a 
defendant’s intent to commit the charged crime, and the defendant sim-
ply attacks the witness’s credibility, courts will have to determine whether 
that impeachment constitutes “active contest” of intent. Moreover, 
questions are certain to arise about timing if a defendant delays actively 
contesting the mental element of the offense until late in the case. For 
example, if the defense does not contest intent until calling witnesses in 
its case-in-chief, the prosecution will need to present rebuttal witnesses to 
present its Rule 404(b) evidence. And requiring “active contest” as a 
prerequisite to admitting other-acts evidence would create extreme diffi-
culties if a defendant waits to contest intent until closing arguments after 
the close of all evidence. Because it seems impossible to draft rule text 
that will accurately cover all possible nuances, an amendment that adds 
such a requirement may not be worth the candle.234 
                                                                                                                           
 233. Of course, if an amendment were to combine both a propensity ban and an 
“active contest” requirement, all the difficulties in the application of a propensity ban 
would continue to be in play. 
 234. Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 321. The 
problem of line drawing here is analogous to the situation in which the defendant, at a 
proffer session, signs an agreement that his statements can be used in contradiction of a 
position that the defense takes at trial. Just recently, the Second Circuit, in a lengthy opin-
ion, analyzed a variety of arguments that the defendant could make without opening the 
door, and also described a number of arguments the making of which would open the 
door to allow admission of the proffer statements. See United States v. Rosemond, 841 
F.3d 95, 110–14 (2d Cir. 2016). The length and speciﬁcity of the analysis is most helpful. 
But it is the kind of analysis that is probably better found in a lengthy opinion than in the 
text of an Evidence Rule. 
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Indeed, federal judges already disagree about the type of defense 
that creates a dispute that may be resolved by other-acts evidence. For 
example, in United States v. Hall, the government prosecuted the defen-
dant for the possession with intent to distribute marijuana, as well as for 
gun offenses, based upon the presence of marijuana and guns in a lock-
ed bedroom in his house.235 Because the government could not prove the 
defendant’s actual possession of the contraband, it relied on his con-
structive possession of the drugs and guns in his house to prove its 
case.236 At trial, the defendant offered the testimony of a cousin who 
claimed that he also lived in the house and that the drugs and guns in 
the locked room belonged to him and not to the defendant.237 Over a 
defense objection, the government admitted the defendant’s four prior 
marijuana offenses to demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of the 
marijuana and intent with respect to the drugs in the locked room.238 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found admission of the defendant’s 
prior convictions erroneous due in part to the defendant’s failure to 
contest knowledge and intent.239 The majority noted that the defendant 
did not dispute his knowledge of marijuana or that he intended to dis-
tribute it if he possessed it but argued only that he had no dominion or 
control over the drugs and guns in the locked room.240 A vehement 
dissent argued that the defendant’s presentation of a “cock-and-bull” 
story characterizing himself as an innocent occupant randomly living in a 
residence housing a marijuana distribution operation was sufficient to ac-
tively contest defendant’s knowledge and intent and to open the door to 
his prior marijuana convictions.241 Enshrining an “active contest” re-
quirement within the text of Rule 404(b) is certain to intensify the 
already heated debate among the federal courts about what it means to 
actively contest an element, without offering any hard and fast answers. 
Hall raises another concern about an “active contest” amendment, 
namely that there may be circumstances in which “active contest” should 
not be a necessary predicate to use of other-acts evidence. Another poten-
tial purpose for admitting the defendant’s prior convictions in Hall could 
have been to impeach his testifying cousin based upon bias.242 The 
defendant’s previous record illustrated why his cousin might be willing to 
take the fall to protect the defendant from the signiﬁcant prison time he 
would face as a repeat offender. Even if the defense did not actively 
                                                                                                                           
 235. 858 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 261, 263. 
 238. Id. at 262–64. 
 239. Id. at 263–64. 
 240. Id. at 263. 
 241. Id. at 290–91 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 242. See id. at 291. The majority rejects this argument in part because the government 
did not rely on this basis for admitting the prior convictions. See id. at 285–86 (majority 
opinion). 
2018] CHARACTER ASSASSINATION 813 
contest the defendant’s knowledge or intent, the defendant’s prior 
convictions would tend to discredit his cousin without relying upon any 
propensity reasoning whatsoever. The defendant’s record and the cous-
in’s lack of record gave the cousin a powerful incentive to accept 
responsibility in the defendant’s place. These facts could have helped the 
jury evaluate the credibility of the cousin’s testimony. Of course, the Rule 
403 balancing required as part of the Rule 404(b) analysis might serve to 
exclude defendant’s prior drug convictions offered for this purpose 
when the prejudice of potential propensity could substantially outweigh 
any impeachment value. But it would be close, given that the cousin was 
the star witness for the defense and given that Rule 403 favors 
admissibility by requiring that prejudice “substantially outweigh” proba-
tive value. Most importantly, the impeachment purpose for offering the 
prior convictions would seem to be a proper nonpropensity purpose 
despite the absence of “active contest” by the defendant. Even the 
Seventh Circuit in Gomez articulated the need for “active contest” by the 
defendant in prosecutions involving general intent crimes, but recog-
nized that such a wholesale requirement would not be appropriate for 
proving speciﬁc intent crimes.243 
In addition, although the recent push to restrict Rule 404(b) 
evidence in the federal courts has targeted common abuses in the 
admission of other-acts evidence against criminal defendants, adding an 
“active contest” requirement to Rule 404(b)(2) would not serve to pro-
tect criminal defendants alone. Any litigant seeking to offer evidence of 
acts other than those at issue in a given case must comply with Rule 
404(b).244 Hence, requiring an opponent to actively contest an element 
or issue before other-acts evidence may be admitted would burden 
criminal defendants relying upon Rule 404(b)(2) to advance reverse 
404(b) evidence, as well as civil litigants who must also resort to Rule 
404(b)(2) to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.245 There-
fore, an “active contest” requirement may be an overly broad response to 
speciﬁc problems involving government reliance on Rule 404(b) evi-
dence in criminal cases. 
Furthermore, adding an “active contest” mandate to Rule 404(b) 
threatens to undermine and obfuscate the meaning of the Supreme Court’s 
dicta in Old Chief v. United States.246 In Old Chief, the Court held that a 
defendant’s offer to stipulate to his felon status during his trial on a 
felon-in-possession charge rendered proof of his prior felony assault 
                                                                                                                           
 243. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 244. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(b) (requiring that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in 
“civil cases and proceedings” and “criminal cases and proceedings”). 
 245. Although it would require a criminal defendant offering reverse 404(b) evidence 
to articulate the “active contest” to which the evidence goes, the government would ac-
tively pursue every element in a criminal case in order to meet its burden of proof. 
 246. 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997). 
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inadmissible under Rule 403.247 In the course of its reasoning, however, 
the Court emphasized that the government generally has the authority to 
“prove its case by evidence of its own choice.”248 More speciﬁcally, as to 
Rule 404(b), the Court stated that “if . . . there were a justiﬁcation for re-
ceiving evidence of the nature of prior acts on some issue other than 
status (i.e., to prove ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,’ Fed. Rule Evid. 
404(b)), Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek its admission.”249 
Notably, Old Chief distinguished between stipulations to the defend-
ant’s legal status, which can be forced upon the prosecution, and 
stipulations to other elements of a crime, such as “intent” or “know-
ledge,” which the prosecution is entitled to reject.250 The Court reasoned 
“that proof of the defendant’s status goes to an element entirely outside 
the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and 
doing to commit the current offense.”251 In contrast, the intent and 
knowledge elements go directly to “what the defendant is charged with 
thinking and doing to commit the current offense.”252 Since Old Chief, 
federal courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead with respect to 
stipulations and Rule 404(b). In United States v. Crowder, for example, the 
D.C. Circuit sitting en banc relied on the Old Chief dictum in reaching its 
holding: “[W]e hold that a defendant’s offer to stipulate to an element 
of an offense does not render the government’s other crimes evidence 
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) to prove that element, even if the de-
fendant’s proposed stipulation is unequivocal . . . .”253 
The addition of an “active contest” requirement to Rule 404(b) 
would seem to undermine the Supreme Court’s dictum in Old Chief and 
to reverse the result in cases like Crowder. By deﬁnition, an “active con-
test” precondition to the admission of other-acts evidence would mean 
that a defense offer to concede a particular point through a binding 
stipulation would foreclose access to Rule 404(b) evidence on that point, 
period. Indeed, in Gomez, in discussing its “active contest” requirement, 
the Seventh Circuit cited Old Chief for the proposition that “if a 
defendant offers to concede or stipulate to the fact for which the 
evidence is offered,” such as mental state, “additional evidence may have 
little probative value,” thereby making bad acts inadmissible.254 An 
amendment designed to prevent overreaching by the prosecution could, 
thus, serve to place defendants in the driver’s seat with respect to other-
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acts evidence, carefully stipulating to any element that might call for 
admission of prior misdeeds, while resting a defense on speciﬁc elements 
free from such risk. While probative value of other acts is already dimin-
ished by a defendant’s offer to stipulate under the Rule 403 analysis that 
applies to Rule 404(b) evidence, a hard and fast amendment that gives 
criminal defendants exclusive control over the admissibility of other-acts 
evidence may swing too far in the other direction—unfairly hampering 
the government in carrying a heavy burden of proof. 
A ﬁnal problem with amending Rule 404(b) to include an “active 
contest” requirement is that the requirement itself appears not to be 
grounded in Rule 404(b) at all. Rather it is more logically grounded in 
Rule 403, and most courts, such as the Gomez court, place the require-
ment in Rule 403.255 Rule 404(b) requires the proponent to articulate a 
purpose for the bad-acts evidence other than to prove character and 
conduct in accordance therewith. Once the court ﬁnds that the evidence 
is probative for a proper, noncharacter purpose, the analysis shifts to 
Rule 403. Under Rule 403, the court determines whether the probative 
value for the noncharacter purpose is substantially outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect (that is, the risk that the evidence will actually be 
considered to demonstrate defendant’s character).256 The government’s 
need to utilize other-acts evidence for a noncharacter purpose is dimin-
ished if the defendant does not actively contest that purpose. Put another 
way, other-acts evidence may demonstrate knowledge, for example, with-
out proceeding through any propensity inference in accordance with 
Rule 404(b), but the probative value of the evidence will be weak on the 
Rule 403 scale if the defendant does not actively contest knowledge.257 
Therefore, consideration of a defendant’s “active contest” of an element 
of an offense is a key component of a sound Rule 403 analysis and not a 
component of Rule 404(b) at all. It would be odd to amend a rule when 
its major effect would be on a different rule.258 
In sum, while an examination of the live disputes in a criminal case 
is an essential part of determining the admissibility of other-acts evi-
dence, an amendment to Rule 404(b) that makes “active contest” by the 
opponent a hard and fast requirement may be impracticable and costly 
to police and may unfairly disadvantage the government in its effort to 
prove charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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C.  Inextricably Intertwined Doctrine Laid to Rest 
Another possibility being considered by the Advisory Committee is 
to amend Rule 404(b) to rein in the overuse of the “inextricably inter-
twined” doctrine by many federal courts.259 As described above, federal 
courts routinely rely on vague references to acts by a criminal defendant 
that are “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense to bypass a 
Rule 404(b) analysis altogether.260 The recent Green and Gorman opinions 
in the Third and Seventh Circuits seek to eliminate or, at least, to limit 
the doctrine of “inextricably intertwined” bad acts of a criminal defen-
dant.261 Limiting the application of this doctrine through an amendment 
to Rule 404(b) could serve to channel a criminal defendant’s prior 
misdeeds through the intended Rule 404(b) analysis and to eliminate the 
shortcut routinely taken through liberal labeling of prior acts as “inex-
tricably intertwined” with charged acts. 
Although crafting an amendment to mark the elusive line between 
evidence “of” the charged act itself and evidence of “other” acts would 
be challenging, one potential textual remedy for the overly broad “inex-
tricably intertwined” doctrine being considered by the Advisory Committee 
is to add a “direct/indirect” distinction to Rule 404(b)(1).262 Such an 
amendment could provide: 
(b) CRIMES, WRONGS, OR OTHER ACTS. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 
act—offered as indirect evidence of a matter in dispute—is 
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.263 
A “direct/indirect” amendment like this one could prevent courts 
from casually applying an “inextricably intertwined” label in cases like 
United States v. Hilgeford, discussed above.264 To prove the willful ﬁling of 
false tax returns, the government offered evidence that in the years prior 
to the challenged tax returns, Hilgeford generated “a blizzard of compli-
cated and groundless litigation, primarily involving his fruitless attempts 
to regain his two farms.”265 Although the court held that Rule 404(b) was 
                                                                                                                           
 259. See Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 5 (noting 
the Advisory Committee’s intention to devote attention to the “inextricably intertwined” 
doctrine). 
 260. See supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 171–196 and accompanying text. 
 262. Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Fall 2017 Meeting Agenda 137–38 (Oct. 1, 
2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/ER33-
YCS4] (discussing the possibility of amending Rule 404(b) to include a “direct/indirect” 
distinction). 
 263. The emphasized language represents suggested additions to Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(1). 
 264. See supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
 265. United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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inapplicable because the baseless litigation was “‘intricately related to the 
facts of the case’ at hand,”266 an amendment requiring Rule 404(b) 
analysis of all acts proving the charged offense “indirectly” would force 
these acts into the Rule 404(b) framework because they did not even 
occur in the time period covered by the indictment—and were admis-
sible if at all only as circumstantial evidence of the crime. 
Such an amendment would not be without difficulties, however. For 
one thing, a distinction between “direct” and “indirect” evidence may in 
some cases fail to create a demarcation that is any clearer than that 
found in the existing case law. In the wire fraud prosecution in United 
States v. Loftis, for example, the Ninth Circuit overruled the trial court’s 
determination that evidence of frauds not speciﬁed in the indictment 
would be evaluated under Rule 404(b).267 The court held that Rule 
404(b) was inapplicable for two separate reasons. The ﬁrst reason was 
that the crime charged included not only the speciﬁc executions of the 
fraud scheme alleged in the indictment, but also “the overall scheme.”268 
Thus, the uncharged frauds were direct evidence of the charged scheme 
to defraud. For cases like Loftis, even a “direct/indirect” distinction may 
be difficult to draw. And for courts currently inclined to apply the “inex-
tricably intertwined” doctrine broadly, such remaining ambiguity in a 
direct/indirect distinction presents a perfect opportunity to broadly con-
strue the term “direct” in an amended rule to achieve similar results. 
Second, even in cases in which the distinction between direct and 
indirect evidence seems clear, a textual distinction that sweeps all acts 
constituting “indirect” evidence of a charged offense into a Rule 404(b) 
analysis may expand the coverage of Rule 404(b) unnecessarily. For 
example, consider evidence that a defendant, charged with bank rob-
bery, was seen the day after the robbery burning a ski mask in a trash can 
in his backyard. That is not “direct” evidence of the robbery itself, but it 
is not at all clear that this circumstantial evidence should have to proceed 
through Rule 404(b). On the other hand, evidence that the defendant 
shot a witness two days after the robbery is also “indirect” evidence that 
seems much more appropriate for Rule 404(b) treatment. The point is 
that there is signiﬁcant room for argument and line drawing when it 
comes to acts that are “close” to the crime even if not part of the crime 
itself. 
Increasing the coverage of Rule 404(b) to include acts like the burn-
ing of the ski mask posited above certainly would not affect the ultimate 
admissibility of the evidence. Even if forced through a Rule 404(b) analy-
sis, an act like destruction of evidence that demonstrates concealment 
and consciousness of guilt would have little propensity risk and would 
                                                                                                                           
 266. Id. at 1345 (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 929 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 
1991)). 
 267. 843 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 268. Id. at 1177. 
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easily pass muster under the four-part Rule 404(b) test. Still, expanding 
the scope of Rule 404(b) with a “direct/indirect” distinction would 
generate signiﬁcant work for prosecutors who would be required to iden-
tify and give notice of all acts providing indirect evidence of the charged 
offense. The burdens in doing so, and the risk of losing technical Rule 
404(b) evidence due to under-identiﬁcation, hardly seem worth it to ad-
mit probative and noncontroversial evidence that is causing no current 
problems in federal criminal cases. An expanded Rule 404(b) would 
create more work for trial judges too, who would have to perform the 
four-part Rule 404(b) analysis for all acts indirectly probative of the 
charged offense and to make ﬁndings on the record concerning their 
admissibility. For example, evidence that a criminal defendant purchased 
the gun used in the charged murder weeks before the killing ordinarily 
would not raise a Rule 404(b) issue. Under an amended rule containing 
a “direct/indirect” distinction, the trial judge would have to perform a 
full Rule 404(b) analysis before admitting this act offering only “in-
direct” evidence of the charged murder. Amendments that tax already 
scarce judicial resources to increase scrutiny of highly probative and 
admissible evidence would seem ill-advised. 
Finally, line drawing in the Rule 404(b) context can never be elimi-
nated completely. Rule 404(b), by deﬁnition, applies only to “other” 
crimes, wrongs, or acts and not to the charged acts themselves. It may 
make little sense to amend the Rule and potentially create more work for 
litigants and judges without truly eradicating the slippery line-drawing 
exercise that precipitated it. While a “direct/indirect” distinction may be 
the best potential addition to Rule 404(b) to deal with the “inextricably 
intertwined” doctrine, it may be that an amendment can do no better 
than the courts have done in delineating what is covered by Rule 404(b) 
and what is not. Perhaps the best that can be hoped is that courts that 
currently treat “inextricably intertwined” as a res gestae exception to Rule 
404(b) will heed the call of the circuits that have sought to impose more 
rigor on the doctrine.269 
                                                                                                                           
 269. See supra notes 170–182 and accompanying text. It should be said that a 
“direct/indirect” textual solution at least seems miles better than other possible ﬁxes. For 
example, adding language that Rule 404(b) doesn’t apply to evidence of acts “inextricably 
intertwined” with the charged crime adds nothing to the enterprise. Moreover, if applying 
Rule 404(b) to all “indirect” evidence would end up expanding the Rule’s coverage in 
some courts, the consequences are not terrible. There will be costs of resolution, to be 
sure. But the only substantive difference is that the notice requirement of Rule 404(b) will 
apply—because indirect evidence close to the crime will almost certainly ﬁt a noncharacter 
purpose like “background” or “context” and so will be admissible even if Rule 404(b) ap-
plies to it. 
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V. AN ELEGANT SOLUTION TO A CLASSIC PROBLEM: A MORE PROTECTIVE 
BALANCING TEST FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
Given all the potential pitfalls involved in amending the time-
honored provisions of Rule 404(b), it is tempting simply to leave well 
enough alone and hope that the federal courts will follow the lead of the 
recent cases out of the Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuits and restore 
Rule 404(b) to its intended role as a rule of exclusion. Indeed, some 
voices may decry any effort to alter the provisions of Rule 404(b) in any 
manner, arguing that the federal courts should be left to resolve inade-
quacies in the Rule through judicial interpretation.270 Although that is 
certainly a credible alternative, there is reason to be skeptical about the 
willingness of circuits with longstanding traditions of permissive and in-
clusive admission of other-acts evidence to follow their stricter sister 
circuits. And it will certainly take time for other circuits to come around. 
The rulemaking process is slow, of course, taking more than two-and-a-
half years from an Advisory Committee proposal to date of enactment.271 
But achieving judicial uniformity on a rule as controversial and ingrained 
as Rule 404(b) is likely to take far longer than that. The whole point of a 
codiﬁcation of evidence rules is that they are uniform. And yet the 
current state of the law on one of the most important evidence rules is 
hardly that. Furthermore, even if all circuits were to ride the wave of the 
recent recalibration in Rule 404(b) analysis, the recent opinions may go 
too far in stating a total ban on the use of any other act that relies to any 
extent on a propensity inference and in permitting defense stipulations 
to foreclose other-acts evidence in certain cases, as discussed above.272 
Therefore, an amendment to the text of Rule 404(b) may indeed be the 
most efficient and effective method for refereeing the contemporary use 
of other-acts evidence in federal criminal cases, and the time may be 
right for the Advisory Committee to weigh in on the Rule 404(b) circuit 
split. 
One amendment that would go beyond simply enshrining the re-
quirements imposed in recent federal cases in the text of Rule 404(b) 
could provide a more elegant solution than the potential amendments 
outlined above, restoring Rule 404(b) to its exclusionary purpose without 
imposing rigid solutions like total propensity bans or active contest man-
dates, and without adding troublesome and elusive new terminology to 
the text of Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b)(2) could be amended to require 
that the proper probative value of any other crime, wrong, or act 
                                                                                                                           
 270. See Spring 2017 Advisory Comm. Meeting Agenda, supra note 73, at 18–19 
(stating that some have suggested that the solution to the Rule 404(b) circuit split is “to 
allow courts to be inﬂuenced by the cases decided by the Seventh and Third Circuits”). 
 271. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2012) (describing the procedure by which proposed 
rules become enacted, including the deadline for transmission and the effective date). 
 272. See supra notes 207–214 and accompanying text. 
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admitted against a criminal defendant outweigh any unfair prejudice to 
that defendant likely to result from admission of the bad acts evidence.273 
The standard Rule 403 balancing test applies to the admission of all 
other acts under the existing version of Rule 404(b). Although Rule 403 
serves as a basis for the exclusion of evidence, the balance it strikes favors 
admissibility by requiring that unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh[]” 
any probative value in order to exclude.274 An amendment that requires 
the probative value of other acts offered against a criminal defendant to 
outweigh the potential for prejudice would tip the scale in favor of exclu-
sion, restoring a baseline that is consistent with the exclusionary intent of 
Rule 404(b)(1).275 This amendment would appear within Rule 
                                                                                                                           
 273. The application of a more protective balance that favors criminal defendants in 
the Rule 404(b) context is not an untested concept. Both Virginia and Pennsylvania have 
enacted versions of Rule 404(b) that contain just such an approach to other-acts evidence. 
Pennsylvania’s rule provides as follows: 
This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab-
sence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is 
admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its po-
tential for unfair prejudice. 
Pa. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Virginia’s rule provides as follows: 
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to 
prove the character trait of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith. However, if the legitimate probative value 
of such proof outweighs its incidental prejudice, such evidence is ad-
missible if it tends to prove any relevant fact pertaining to the offense 
charged, such as where it is relevant to show motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, accident, or 
if they are part of a common scheme or plan. 
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 2:404 (emphasis added). In addition, Uniform Rule of Evidence 404(c) 
contains a similar heightened balancing test. Unif. R. Evid. 404(c) (1999). 
 274. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see, e.g., United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082, 1091 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy . . . ‘which should be used only sparingly 
since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence.’” (quoting 
United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992))). 
 275. See Milich, supra note 9, at 789, 797–98 (noting the “diluted and vague 
expression of the illegitimate use of character evidence fares poorly . . . particularly when 
the balancing test is uneven—the evidence is excluded only if the illegitimate effects 
‘substantially outweigh’ the probative value” and suggesting that courts reorient balancing 
to mitigate systemic prejudice). In Virginia, where this protective balancing is already in 
place, the criminal cases reﬂect a more circumspect approach to other-acts evidence. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Rankin, 93 Va. Cir. 169, 173 (2016) (“The Court agrees with the 
Defense that such evidence [of a 2011 shooting] would be highly prejudicial to the 
Defendant and that any legitimate probative value of the evidence does not outweigh such 
prejudice.”); see also Pryor v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 820, 822 (Va. 2008) (ﬁnding it 
erroneous to allow videotape of a later drug transaction to be used to prove identity in 
connection with an earlier drug sale because even assuming the later transaction was 
relevant to corroborate the defendant’s visits to the location, its probative value could not 
overcome its prejudicial effect); Scates v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 756, 758–60 (Va. 
2001) (reversing the burglary conviction in a case in which the prosecution introduced 
testimony that the defendant used credit cards to break into “homes” because there was 
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404(b)(2)—thus supplanting the Rule 403 test when bad acts are offered 
against the accused. The amendment would provide as follows: 
(b) CRIMES, WRONGS, OR OTHER ACTS. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case.276 This 
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such 
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident—but may not be admitted against a defendant in a 
criminal case unless its probative value outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to that defendant.277 
A more protective balancing test for criminal defendants could re-
solve many longstanding failings in the application of Rule 404(b) with-
out creating new struggles for courts and litigants that could ﬂow from 
the alternative amendments discussed above.278 
                                                                                                                           
no use of a credit card in the charged offense and the testimony prejudiced the defendant 
by suggesting multiple other offenses); Donahue v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 768, 773–
74 (Va. 1983) (reversing the conviction as a result of trial court’s erroneous admission of 
defendant’s prior conviction for distribution of PCP to establish her “intent” to distribute 
drugs on the charged occasion when defense claimed only that drugs belonged to defen-
dant’s husband). 
 276. This amendment also could be coupled with an amendment moving the criminal 
notice provisions to a new and separate subsection. 
 277. The Kansas Evidence Code includes a speciﬁc reference to its version of Rule 403 
in its version of 404(b). Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-455(b) (West 2016). Generally, express 
references to Rule 403 in any particular evidence rule seem ill-advised because such 
references are superﬂuous. Rule 403 applies unless it is speciﬁcally supplanted by another 
rule—such as the special balancing test provided for civil cases involving sexual assault. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 412. It should be noted, though, that Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) 
does contain an express reference to the Rule 403 balancing test (for all witnesses other 
than the accused) to contrast it with the heightened balancing required for criminal de-
fendants. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). It could be argued that the same contrast should be 
emphasized in an amended Rule 404(b) that provided a more protective balancing test for 
criminal defendants. But a distinguishing factor is that Rule 609 contains four different 
admissibility tests in the same rule: automatic admissibility (subdivision (a)(2)), Rule 403 
(subdivision (a)(1)(A)), probative value outweighs prejudicial effect (subdivision 
(a)(1)(B)), and a reverse Rule 403 test (subdivision (b)). Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)–(b). When 
Rule 609 was restyled, the drafters decided that it would be too confusing to speciﬁcally 
provide for the other three balancing tests, but leave a vacuum for the Rule 403 test. See 
Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence: 2017–2018 Edition 121 (2017). That same 
confusion is unlikely to exist in an amended Rule 404(b) as discussed in text. Therefore, 
the proposal in text does not set forth a Rule 403 balancing test when bad-acts evidence is 
offered in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case. Any question about 
continued Rule 403 applicability in such cases can be addressed in a committee note. 
 278. Indeed, there is some support in the literature for an enhanced balancing in the 
Rule 404(b) context. See Frank, supra note 19, at 43 (proposing reverse balancing, among 
other amendments); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 Vill. L. 
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A. A Silver Bullet 
Providing criminal defendants with a more protective balancing test 
within the text of Rule 404(b) would resolve many of the problems in the 
traditional permissive approach to Rule 404(b) evidence in criminal 
cases. First and foremost, a more protective balancing test that favors ex-
clusion would make clear once and for all that Rule 404(b) is not a rule 
of “inclusion” that provides for “presumptive admissibility” of other-acts 
evidence. As examined above, federal courts that routinely admit other-
acts evidence consistently begin a Rule 404(b) analysis by emphasizing 
that the Rule is one of “inclusion” that expressly “permits” other-acts evi-
dence. Courts like these have suggested that “404(b) evidence . . . should 
not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case”279 
and that Rule 404(b) “admits evidence of other crimes or acts relevant to 
any issue in the trial, unless it tends to prove only criminal disposition.”280 
Directing district courts to exclude other-acts evidence offered against a 
criminal defendant unless its probative value for a proper noncharacter 
purpose is stronger than any prejudice likely to result would help to re-
claim Rule 404(b) as the rule of “exclusion” it was intended to be.281 
Such a balancing test could assist with the problem of pure 
propensity uses for other-acts evidence without imposing a rigid pro-
pensity prohibition. By setting a higher standard for the admission of 
other-acts evidence against criminal defendants, a heightened balancing 
test would naturally encourage prosecutors and trial judges to articulate 
the probative value of other-acts evidence to ensure that it clears the 
higher hurdle set by a more protective balancing and that its admission 
survives appellate scrutiny. A more protective test also would demand 
that judges identify the type and magnitude of unfair prejudice likely to 
result from admission of other-acts evidence. Because the standard Rule 
403 balancing test favors admission of other-acts evidence possessing any 
                                                                                                                           
Rev. 1465, 1497 (1985) (predicting courts would adopt a restrictive approach to Rule 
404(b) evidence at odds with the language of Rule 402 and Rule 403 and proposing 
addition of protective balancing to bring the Rule in line with pre-Rules federal opinions); 
Milich, supra note 9, at 799 (“A stepped up balancing test in Rule 404(b) would require 
that the state’s need for the evidence outweighs the policy that the presumption of 
innocence should remain intact whenever possible.”); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the 
Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 
135, 140–41 (1989) (proposing an amendment to Rule 403 that would provide protective 
balancing of evidence offered against criminal defendants under Rules 404(b), 608(b), 
and 609(a)(1)). 
 279. United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1225 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 280. United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 538 (8th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 281. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 908 
(explaining that other-acts evidence proffered by the prosecution in a criminal case 
should possess “substantial” noncharacter relevance). 
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probative value, courts rarely devote signiﬁcant analysis to the prejudice 
side of the equation following an incantation of permissible purposes 
under Rule 404(b).282 A more protective balancing test that requires pro-
bative value to overpower unfair prejudice would necessitate a closer look 
at the particular prejudice in a speciﬁc case and would tilt the scales 
against admission of other-acts evidence that creates signiﬁcant propen-
sity concerns.283 For example, in the ubiquitous federal drug prosecution 
in which the defendant merely denies engaging in the unlawful conduct, 
evidence of prior drug convictions undoubtedly creates signiﬁcant risk of 
a prejudicial propensity use by the fact-ﬁnder. Any probative value that a 
trial court might ﬁnd to show the defendant’s “intent” or “knowledge” 
would be overshadowed by the predictable dynamite effect of the prior 
misdeeds in suggesting the defendant’s tendency to commit drug of-
fenses, thus dooming the evidence to exclusion. 
While such a balancing test could alleviate the problem of other acts 
offered for pure propensity purposes, it would not impose a complete 
ban on the admission of other-acts evidence, the probative value of which 
may depend on some propensity reasoning. As discussed above, the gov-
ernment should be permitted to prove a defendant’s prior acts of 
possession with intent to distribute drugs in cases in which the defendant 
admits possession of a distribution quantity of the same drug in a trial on 
similar charges, but testiﬁes that he intended to retain it for personal use 
and not sell it. More than simply pleading “not guilty,” that defendant 
has injected a live dispute about his state of mind and intent into the 
case. The prosecution needs evidence to resolve the dispute and to meet 
its high burden of proof, and alternative evidence to demonstrate state of 
mind (beyond the act itself that the defendant has already sought to 
explain away) will be difficult to obtain. In such a case, the probative 
value of prior intentional drug distribution to resolve the narrow issue of 
“intent” is strong and outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. As 
discussed above, ascertaining precisely when propensity inferences are at 
play is a slippery task, and commentators have argued that the use of a 
prior conviction to show intent in a case like this one does involve in-
ferences about the defendant’s tendencies.284 Even assuming that it does, 
the government should be permitted to use the evidence to combat such 
an active dispute of intent. While a rigid propensity ban would jeopardize 
the government’s ability to call on evidence of prior convictions in this 
                                                                                                                           
 282. See, e.g., Geddes, 844 F.3d at 990–91 (concluding, without analysis, that danger of 
unfair prejudice was “minimal” because the witness testiﬁed “only” to the defendant’s 
prior unrelated act of physical assault); Smith, 741 F.3d at 1225–26 (affirming admission of 
defendant’s prior drug possession convictions because they were probative of his intent, 
which he made a material issue by pleading not guilty, without analyzing likely unfair pre-
judice to defendant). 
 283. See supra section IV.B –.C. 
 284. See Sonenshein, supra note 10, at 257 n.283. 
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scenario, a ﬂexible but protective balancing test would continue to 
permit it. 
As this discussion demonstrates, other-acts evidence could gain pro-
bative value in a trial in which defendants dispute certain elements of the 
charges against them. A more protective balancing test would thus 
preserve the importance of a defendant’s “active contest” of particular 
elements as emphasized in recent circuit precedent. But, it would do so 
in a ﬂexible manner that does not rigidly require a court to deﬁne and 
identify “active contest.” Further, adoption of a protective balancing test 
instead of an “active contest” mandate would preserve the trial court’s 
discretion in dealing with defense offers to stipulate to certain points, as 
suggested by the Supreme Court in Old Chief.285 While defense offers to 
stipulate would undoubtedly affect probative value under a balancing 
test, they would not necessarily be dispositive due to the government’s 
need to present its case in a compelling way. To be sure, a more protect-
ive balancing test could still permit the government to use other-acts 
evidence even in the acknowledged absence of any “active” contest. As 
explained by the Seventh Circuit in Gomez, when a criminal defendant 
pleads not guilty to a speciﬁc intent charge, intent is “automatically” at 
issue.286 While that does not necessarily mean that other-acts evidence is 
“automatically” admissible, it does leave a trial judge free to admit such 
evidence to assist the government in proving intent even when there is 
no “active contest” or testimony about intent at trial, if the court deter-
mines that the government’s need for the evidence to meet its burden of 
proof is strong enough to overcome prejudice to the defendant. While a 
mechanical “active contest” mandate would threaten to undermine the 
government’s ability to offer other-acts evidence in speciﬁc intent cases, a 
balancing test would continue to allow trial judges to assess the need for 
such evidence on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the more protective balancing 
test would do much of the work that an “active contest” limitation would 
do, without adding categorical and potentially confusing language about 
“active contest” to the text of the rule. 
Finally, a more protective balancing test that favors only criminal 
defendants would continue to permit criminal defendants to offer 
“reverse 404(b)” evidence without any new obstacles like an “active 
contest” requirement or propensity ban in the way. Unlike other poten-
tial amendments, this balancing approach would also leave civil cases un-
touched. There is no demonstrated need for a change in the application 
of Rule 404(b) or to the standard Rule 403 balancing in civil cases, or in 
cases in which the defendant offers evidence of other acts. The reason 
for a new, more protective balancing test is to address the well-documented 
prejudice suffered uniquely by criminal defendants when their character 
is attacked by bad-acts evidence. Singling out criminal defendants for 
                                                                                                                           
 285. See supra notes 246–252 and accompanying text. 
 286. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 858–69 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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special protections is appropriate and time honored in light of the high 
stakes for defendants facing the prosecutorial power of the government. 
The case has not been made that similar abuses are routine when other-
acts evidence is offered in civil cases or in the rare case in which the 
criminal defendant seeks to offer other-acts evidence. Furthermore, the 
standard Rule 403 balancing is more than adequate to address any 
concerns in these circumstances in which the liberty of the opponent of 
the evidence is not in jeopardy. The proposed amendment, therefore, 
seeks to capture the trend in some federal courts to impose a more rig-
orous analysis of bad-acts evidence when it is offered against criminal 
defendants.287 
One of the principal beneﬁts of an amended balancing test is that it 
eschews rigid and mechanical solutions that are ill-suited to Rule 404(b). 
On the other side of that coin, a ﬂexible balancing test by deﬁnition 
would leave signiﬁcant discretion to trial judges. This is likely to be one 
of the chief criticisms of a proposal to add a new balancing test to Rule 
404(b). A heightened balancing test cannot entirely control innate judi-
cial tendencies to admit other-acts evidence permissively. There is reason 
to expect that an amendment adding a protective balancing test to Rule 
404(b) would have signiﬁcant effects, however. Entering the stage some 
forty-plus years after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, such 
an amendment would signal an unmistakable change in the status quo 
that would be impossible for courts to ignore. Furthermore, a detailed 
Advisory Committee Note accompanying an amended balancing test 
would enhance its operation by emphasizing the purposes for the ad-
dition to the rule and highlighting the shortcomings in the traditional 
approach that the amendment seeks to correct. Such a committee note 
could provide, as follows: 
 
Committee Note 
Rule 404(b)(2) has been amended to require that the 
proper probative value of any crime, wrong, or other act 
                                                                                                                           
 287. There have been longstanding concerns about the Huddleston approach to proof 
of other acts as a matter of conditional relevance under Rule 104(b). Some have argued 
for a stronger role for the judge in regulating the admissibility of other-acts evidence and a 
tougher standard of proof for other acts. Although some states have required preliminary 
ﬁndings by the trial judge that the defendant committed the other act and a higher 
standard of proof, see, e.g., Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), federal courts treat the issue as a jury 
question requiring only proof by a preponderance pursuant to the Bourjaily and 
Huddleston line of cases. Adopting a more protective balancing test administered by the 
trial judge pursuant to his or her Rule 104(a) authority to determine admissibility could 
achieve the tighter judicial control over other-acts evidence that many have sought. Even if 
the government could satisfy the low preponderance threshold for showing the defen-
dant’s commission of the other act to justify submission to the jury, a balancing test that 
favors exclusion would afford the trial court a strong and distinct basis for excluding the 
evidence. 
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admitted against a criminal defendant outweigh any unfair 
prejudice to that defendant. This is the same balancing test in 
favor of a criminal defendant prescribed by Rule 609(a)(1)(B). 
No change is being made to the application of Rule 404(b) or 
to the standard Rule 403 balancing test in civil cases, or in cases 
where the criminal defendant offers evidence of other acts. The 
more protective balancing test for criminal defendants is 
weighted in favor of exclusion and clariﬁes that Rule 404(b) is 
not a rule of “inclusion” as some federal opinions have stated. 
In evaluating other-acts evidence pursuant to this amended bal-
ancing test, trial judges should carefully consider how a 
proffered other act is probative for a proper purpose, in order 
to guard against the character reasoning outlawed by Rule 
404(b)(1). For example, where a defendant accused of federal 
drug crimes simply denies commission of the underlying acts, 
prior drug offenses offered to prove “intent” or “knowledge” 
have minimal probative value, and it is very likely that the 
prejudice by way of a propensity inference outweighs any 
limited probative value. In determining the probative value of 
other-acts evidence, trial judges should consider which issues 
are genuinely disputed in the case. While a defendant’s active 
contest of an element to which other act evidence is relevant 
will increase the probative value of other act evidence, an active 
contest is not always required and a defense stipulation is not 
necessarily dispositive of admissibility. The amended balancing 
test requires a weighing of legitimate probative value against 
likely prejudicial effect. Trial judges should carefully evaluate 
the effect of any crime, wrong, or other act of a defendant on 
the fact-ﬁnder and assess the likelihood that such evidence will 
detract from fair consideration of charged offenses. All of these 
factors should be considered in applying the more protective 
balancing test to other-acts evidence offered against a defen-
dant in a criminal case to ensure that the government’s legiti-
mate need for the evidence outweighs the unfair prejudice to 
the defendant from the jury’s consideration of prior bad acts. 
Furthermore, an Advisory Committee Note would be particularly im-
portant in addressing the problem of “inextricably intertwined” acts by a 
defendant that evade Rule 404(b) analysis altogether. The regular Rule 
403 balancing that applies to all evidence would continue to apply to acts 
of the criminal defendant that are not “other acts” regulated by Rule 
404(b), but a heightened balancing test would protect criminal defend-
ants against admission of “other acts.”288 Thus, there would be even more 
at stake in the line drawing exercise than there is now. While a more pro-
tective balancing test may make some trial judges more cautious in ap-
plying the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine to justify avoidance of the 
                                                                                                                           
 288. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 6:42 (noting a regular Rule 403 balancing 
favors admissibility, while the heightened balancing test offered to criminal defendants 
under Rule 609(a) favors exclusion). 
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protective balancing test, federal judges already inclined to admit a 
defendant’s prior misdeeds could be even more motivated to classify them 
as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense to avoid the new 
heightened balancing test. An Advisory Committee Note could address 
this concern, cautioning that: 
Of course, Rule 404(b) and the amended balancing test for 
criminal defendants apply only to evidence of “other” crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. Trial judges must, therefore, determine which 
acts are “other” or extrinsic to the charged offense, necessi-
tating Rule 404(b) analysis, and which are “intrinsic” to the 
charged offense and free from Rule 404(b) scrutiny. Courts 
should not circumvent the more protective balancing test by 
attaching vague and conclusory labels, such as “inextricably 
intertwined,” to a defendant’s other acts. In place of employing 
conclusory labels, trial judges should explain how an act is so 
connected to the charged offense so as to avoid Rule 404(b) 
treatment. Because appropriate line drawing in this context is 
impossible to capture with precision, close calls in classifying a 
defendant’s acts should be resolved in favor of Rule 404(b) ap-
plication—especially given the importance of ﬁltering bad-acts 
evidence through the new and more protective balancing test.289 
At ﬁrst blush, prosecutors may assume that an amendment that adds 
a more protective balancing test for the admission of other-acts evidence 
against a criminal defendant represents a “pro-defendant” modiﬁcation. 
Indeed, some may oppose the addition of a protective balancing test due 
to concern that it would place an unjust obstacle in the path of prose-
cutors who must prove criminal charges beyond a reasonable doubt. But 
a more protective balancing test in reality could represent a more neutral 
amendment than many of the reforms suggested by recent federal 
precedent in the Seventh and Third Circuits.290 A more protective bal-
ancing test for criminal defendants would preserve the government’s 
ability to utilize other-acts evidence to prove intent or modus operandi, 
even though that use may rely to some extent on propensity inferences 
and even without “active contest” by the defendant. Unlike the recent 
circuit precedent suggesting that a criminal defendant can foreclose 
prosecutorial use of other-acts evidence by offering stipulations,291 a 
                                                                                                                           
 289. Commentators have suggested standards for excusing certain acts from the 
coverage of Rule 404(b) that also could be incorporated into a committee note. For exam-
ple, acts that are “part and parcel of the charged offense” or the exclusion of which would 
“render the testimony about the charged crime linguistically or psychologically incom-
prehensible” could be exempt from Rule 404(b) analysis. See Imwinkelried et al., 
Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, §§ 903–904 (quoting Imwinkelried, The 
Second Coming, supra note 65, at 725). The “direct/indirect” distinction examined in the 
text above also could be added to a committee note rather than being enshrined in a 
rule’s text. Of course, the difficulties in administering such a distinction would remain. 
 290. See supra section III.C. 
 291. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857 (suggesting that a defense stipulation could foreclose 
government use of other-acts evidence). 
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protective balancing test would maintain a trial judge’s discretion to 
balance the competing pros and cons of the evidence even in the face of 
a stipulation. An amendment could serve to curtail the “inextricably 
intertwined” doctrine and to push more evidence into the heightened 
balancing test. However, the acts of a criminal defendant that are truly so 
close to the charged offense as to be “inextricably intertwined” with it 
will have no trouble clearing even the hurdle created by the new bal-
ancing test. Importantly, the amendment would not be a true reverse Rule 
403 test and would not require the probative value of an “other act” to 
substantially outweigh any potential prejudice.292 It would simply require 
the scale to tip in favor of the probative value.293 Any act that could 
                                                                                                                           
 292. See Frank, supra note 19, at 43 (proposing amendments to Rule 404(b) that 
would, in part, require probative value to “substantially outweigh[] its prejudicial effect”). 
Of course, it is surely an option for the Advisory Committee to consider a reverse 403 
balancing test for bad-acts evidence offered against a criminal defendant. Federal Rules of 
Evidence 412 and 703 contain true reverse 403 balancing tests. See Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2) 
(allowing evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition in civil cases involving 
alleged sexual misconduct only if its probative value substantially outweighs harm to any 
victim or unfair prejudice to any party); Fed. R. Evid. 703 (allowing an expert witness to 
disclose inadmissible basis for an opinion only when the probative value in helping the 
jury evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs prejudicial effect). Federal Rule 
of Evidence 609(b) employs a heightened reverse 403 balancing test for impeaching 
convictions that are more than ten years old. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) (excluding convictions 
after ten years unless the probative value “supported by speciﬁc facts and circumstances 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect”). This reverse 403 test is designed to stack the 
deck ﬁrmly against admissibility and to exclude the relevant evidence in all but the rarest 
of cases. The proposed amendment to Rule 404(b) is designed to reinstate the Rule as one 
of exclusion and to tip the scale in favor of criminal defendants who suffer signiﬁcant 
prejudice from the admission of their prior bad acts. Still, other-acts evidence should re-
main available to the prosecution in cases in which there is genuine and proper probative 
value, notwithstanding the risk of prejudice. Thus, a true reverse 403 balancing risks swing-
ing the pendulum too far in the other direction. Furthermore, as a matter of practicality, 
such an amendment is unlikely to ﬁnd its way through the rulemaking process. The Justice 
Department—with a voting member on the Advisory Committee and on the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure—is likely to oppose vigorously 
any attempt to completely reverse the balancing test from which it has beneﬁted for forty 
years. Of course, the Department is also likely to oppose even the modest shift in the bal-
ancing test that is proposed in this Article. But there is at least some hope that the more 
modest shift might be seen as a compromise position and as a way to address the strong 
trends in the case law favoring more rigorous application of Rule 404(b). Such a com-
promise would be not unlike that which was reached in Congress when Rule 609(a)(1) was 
enacted to provide a modest protection for criminal defendants. For an account of that 
compromise, see Bellin, supra note 11, at 304–07. 
 293. Another drafting alternative would be to include a balancing test that excludes 
other-acts evidence offered against a criminal defendant whenever probative value is 
outweighed at all by unfair prejudice—even if the probative value is not substantially 
outweighed. State analogues to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, and Tennessee modify the Rule 403 balancing test traditionally applicable to 
other-acts evidence in this way. See Mass. Guide to Evid. § 404(b)(2) (“However, evidence 
of other bad acts is inadmissible where its probative value is outweighed by the risk of un-
fair prejudice to the defendant, even if not substantially outweighed by that risk.”); Minn. 
R. Evid. 404(b) (admitting other-acts evidence only if “the probative value of the evidence 
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legitimately be characterized as “inextricably intertwined” because it 
constitutes part of the charged crime will be more probative than pre-
judicial by deﬁnition. 
B.  Protective Balancing for the Criminal Defendant: Lessons from Rule 609(a) 
Another advantage of a more protective balancing test is that it 
would avoid loading up the familiar Rule 404(b) standard with new 
terminology foreign to the Federal Rules of Evidence, such as “propen-
sity inference,” “active contest,” “direct,” and “indirect,” that would re-
quire interpretation and invite litigation. To the contrary, a modiﬁed 
version of the Rule 403 balancing test that offers increased protection to 
criminal defendants constitutes a familiar and well-understood standard 
already embodied in Rule 609(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
This will enable federal courts to deploy this familiar balancing within 
the Rule 404(b) context. 
Rule 609 authorizes certain prior convictions of a witness to be ad-
mitted to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness, that is, to suggest 
that the witness has an untruthful character and so is lying on the 
stand.294 Due to the potential for unfair prejudice and bad-character rea-
soning when the prior felony convictions of testifying criminal defen-
dants are offered under Rule 609(a)(1), the Rule provides that felony 
                                                                                                                           
is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant”); Tenn. R. Evid. 
404(b) (“The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.”). The “probative value is outweighed by the prejudice” test is 
of course only marginally different from the test advocated in this Article and appears to 
provide some additional protection to criminal defendants. See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 
21 N.E.3d 157, 176 n.27 (Mass. 2014) (“[B]ecause ‘other bad acts’ evidence is ‘inherently 
prejudicial,’ it makes sense to impose a more exacting standard on its admissibility than 
the standard applicable to other evidence.” (citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 617 N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993))); Commonwealth v. Christie, 53 
N.E.3d 1268, 1271 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (“Had the judge had the beneﬁt of the [more 
protective balancing test] he may, of course, have concluded that the challenged evidence 
was not admissible.”). But the difference between the two balancing tests is marked in terms 
of the signal that is sent. The balancing test advocated in this Article makes clear that Rule 
404(b) is a rule of exclusion. Under the test adopted by Massachusetts, Minnesota, and 
Tennessee, Rule 404(b) remains a rule of inclusion. Moreover, adding the “probative 
value is outweighed by the prejudice” test to Rule 404(b) is not ideal as a matter of rule-
making, because it would be the only test with that balance in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. All things being equal, it is a better solution to add a balancing test that is al-
ready found in the Federal Rules. See infra section V.B. 
 294. Rule 609(a)(1) covers felony convictions that do not involve dishonesty or false 
statement. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Subdivision 609(a)(2) covers convictions that involve 
dishonesty or false statement. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Subdivision 609(b) covers “old” 
(and presumably less probative) convictions. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). The balancing test sug-
gested in this Article for Rule 404(b) is identical to the test provided for impeaching crim-
inal defendant-witnesses with recent convictions that did not involve dishonesty or false 
statement. That test is found in Rule 609(a)(1)(B). 
830 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:769 
convictions that do not involve dishonesty or false statement295 may be 
admitted only if their probative value with respect to dishonesty outweighs 
any prejudicial effect to the defendant.296 This more protective balancing 
test has resulted in a number of cases in which non-falsity-based convic-
tions offered for impeachment have been excluded or have been found 
on appeal to have been erroneously admitted. That is especially likely 
when the conviction offered for impeachment is similar to the crime 
charged, or when the conviction is for conduct that is especially inﬂam-
matory.297 This is not to say that results have been absolutely uniform or 
that criminal defendants have received absolute protection.298 The na-
ture of any balancing test is that there is room for play and room for 
unjust results. But it is to say that tipping the balancing test has resulted 
in more protection for criminal defendants, and that federal litigants and 
courts are familiar with this protective balancing test and could readily 
adapt it to the Rule 404(b) context. 
Indeed, there is a certain symmetry to incorporating the same 
balancing test in favor of criminal defendants in both Rules 609 and 
404(b).299 Like Rule 609(a), Rule 404(b) seeks to walk a ﬁne line in crim-
inal cases. It aims to protect against prejudice from past acts that may be 
utilized by a jury to assume that a criminal defendant must have com-
mitted the charged offense if he did something similar on another 
occasion, while at the same time permitting evidence of other acts that 
shed light on important issues in the case. Recognizing the strong like-
lihood of prejudice to a criminal defendant from evidence of past 
misdeeds, Rule 609(a)(1) keeps them out unless their probative value is 
                                                                                                                           
 295. If the prior conviction involves dishonesty or false statement, it is automatically 
admissible against all witnesses in all cases. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). 
 296. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). 
 297. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 283–85 (3d Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding 
a prior felon-ﬁrearm conviction could not be admitted to impeach the accused in a felon-
ﬁrearm prosecution); United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 764 (6th Cir. 2008) (ﬁnding 
error to admit prior convictions for taking indecent liberties with a minor in a prosecution 
for felon–ﬁrearm possession); United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(ﬁnding that, in a bank robbery prosecution, the trial judge excluded the defendant’s 
prior bank robbery convictions under Rule 609(a)(1), but improperly admitted them 
under Rule 609(a)(2)); United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(ﬁnding error to admit evidence of prior convictions for assault and contraband posses-
sion in a prosecution for assault with a dangerous weapon); United States v. Bagley, 772 
F.2d 482, 486–88 (9th Cir. 1985) (ﬁnding error to admit prior robbery convictions in a 
prosecution for bank robbery); United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1277 (5th Cir. 
1977) (ﬁnding error to admit prior narcotics conviction in a prosecution for conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine). 
 298. See Sanders, 964 F.2d at 300 (holding that the admission of a prior conviction 
inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(1) was harmless error as to the possession of contraband 
count); see also Bellin, supra note 11, at 319–35 (suggesting that federal courts have failed 
to apply this balancing as carefully as Congress intended). 
 299. See Milich, supra note 9, at 797–98 n.48 (suggesting a need to apply similar 
balancing to other-acts evidence and prior convictions offered to impeach under Rule 
404(b)); Ordover, supra note 278, at 138, 140–41 (same). 
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actually stronger than that potential for prejudice.300 When the prejudice 
to criminal defendants in the Rule 404(b) and Rule 609(a)(1) contexts is 
similar, a similar protective test in favor of a criminal defendant would 
seem warranted in both circumstances. Arguably, it may be even more 
important to provide more protection to a criminal defendant in the 
Rule 404(b) context than in the already-recognized impeachment con-
text, because a criminal defendant always has the option not to testify 
and may control the admission of prior convictions for impeachment by 
staying off the stand.301 A defendant who wishes to plead not guilty may 
have less choice about the defense she offers and ordinarily has less con-
trol over the application of Rule 404(b) to admit her past misdeeds.302 
Accordingly, amending Rule 404(b) to add an already-established pro-
tective balancing test in favor of criminal defendants would import an 
existing and well-understood standard already in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence into a related arena. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 404(b) is the most litigated Federal Rule of Evidence,303 crop-
ping up routinely in criminal cases, in which jury trials continue to be a 
mainstay. Although Rule 404(b)(1) states an exclusionary rule, cau-
tioning against the use of evidence of “other” crimes, wrongs, or acts to 
suggest a person’s tendencies to behave in a particular manner, it is 
tempered by exceptions in Rule 404(b)(2), which permit the use of such 
evidence for other purposes.304 The most common purposes listed in 
Rule 404(b)(2) are to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”305 It is 
an open secret that federal courts have traditionally played fast and loose 
with other-acts evidence, listing all proper purposes in justifying admis-
sibility and allowing past misdeeds of criminal defendants to come before 
juries on a routine basis. The devastating effect of such other-acts evidence 
on juries is well-documented. 
Recently, the Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuits have issued opin-
ions seeking to restore Rule 404(b) as a rule of exclusion. These opinions 
caution against use of any prior act that depends for its probative value 
                                                                                                                           
 300. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 18, § 6:45 (noting the Rule 609 “framers made 
the judgment that prior convictions are especially risky for criminal defendants, and the 
language of Rule 609(a)(1) is cast in favor of caution”). 
 301. See id. (noting criminal defendants with prior records frequently stay off the 
stand to avoid damaging admission of their prior convictions). 
 302. Id. § 4:28 (“[F]ew categories of evidence bring greater risk of prejudice to the 
accused . . . .”). 
 303. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, supra note 3, § 901 (stating 
that Rule 404(B) “has generated more published opinions than any other subsection of 
the rules”). 
 304. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
 305. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
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upon inferences about a defendant’s “propensity” to conduct him or 
herself in relevant ways. They have emphasized the importance of some 
“active” dispute launched by the defense to bring prior acts into play. Fi-
nally, these courts have worked to funnel all other-acts evidence through 
the Rule 404(b) gauntlet by eliminating or restricting signiﬁcantly the 
doctrine of “inextricably intertwined” acts that may be admitted as part 
of proving the charged offense without application of Rule 404(b). All 
the while, several federal circuit courts continue to treat Rule 404(b) as a 
“rule of inclusion.” 
In order to resolve the conflict in the circuits over the proper handling 
of other-acts evidence in federal criminal cases, the time may be ripe for 
an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Although the limits 
imposed by the Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuits present interesting 
opportunities for modifying the text of the Rule, each of those alter-
natives is rife with difficulties. Rule 404(b)’s history is one of case-by-case 
determinations that eschew mechanical solutions. An amendment that 
could change the tune in the traditional approach to other-acts evidence, 
without cluttering Rule 404(b) with foreign terminology that invites 
costly litigation, would be a new balancing test that favors criminal defen-
dants. Instead of relying on the standard Rule 403 balancing that admits 
other-acts evidence so long as its probative value isn’t “substantially 
outweighed” by unfair prejudice, an amended rule could demand that 
the probative value of other-acts evidence admitted against a criminal 
defendant outweigh any potential for prejudice. By reversing the scale to 
favor exclusion, such an amendment could serve the important goals of 
the recent Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuit precedent in a ﬂexible 
manner consistent with the history and purpose of Rule 404(b). 
 
